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ABSTRACT 
“Should we continue to build there?” is a question asked after other past disasters; it is 
especially more poignant as local, state and federal governments deal with pre-disaster 
mitigation funding and post-disaster emergency management funding issues. The goal of 
this research is to develop a way of answering that question through a better 
understanding of the social, economic, and cultural problems and opportunities of 
rebuilding. As a result, shortcomings in the assumptions of existing response and 
recovery plans can be identified, and current community planning can consider future 
catastrophic events. Through pre-identification of physical, social, and political 
limitations other communities have faced, proactive land use, response, and recovery 
planning decisions could be implemented that increase the chance that communities can 
successfully emerge from disaster.  
This study investigates examples of past catastrophic disasters and the positive 
and negative experiences as those communities struggled to return to normalcy. The end 
result of the research is an assessment that identifies the economic, geopolitical, and 
social factors of recovery following a catastrophic disaster. The research used historical 
case studies and their challenges with recovery. Based on the case study findings, an 
analysis was created of the current economic, geopolitical, and social factors in the City 
of Seaside, Oregon, following a Cascadia Subduction Zone earthquake and tsunami to 
identify future recovery challenges. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This study investigates examples of past catastrophic disasters and the positive and 
negative experiences as those communities struggled to return to normalcy. The end 
result of the research is an assessment that identifies the economic, geopolitical, and 
social factors of recovery following a catastrophic disaster. The research used historical 
case studies and their challenges with recovery. Based on the case study findings, an 
analysis was created of the current economic, geopolitical, and social factors in the City 
of Seaside, Oregon, following a Cascadia Subduction Zone earthquake and tsunami to 
identify future recovery challenges. 
“Should we continue to build there?” is a question asked after other past disasters; 
it is especially more poignant as local, state, and federal governments deal with pre-
disaster mitigation funding and post-disaster emergency management funding issues. The 
goal of this research is to develop a way of answering that question through a better 
understanding of the social, economic, and cultural problems and opportunities of 
rebuilding. As a result of this line of study, shortcomings in the assumptions of existing 
response and recovery plans can be identified, and current community planning can 
consider future catastrophic events. Through pre-identification of physical, social, and 
political limitations other communities have faced, proactive land use, response, and 
recovery-planning decisions could be implemented that increase the likelihood that 
communities can successfully emerge from disaster.  
Seaside, Oregon, has the most concentrated vulnerabilities of Oregon coastal 
communities to damage as a result of a Cascadia Subduction Zone (CSZ) earthquake and 
tsunami,1 modeled to generate a 9.0 magnitude earthquake and a resulting tsunami 12–80 
feet in height.2 The devastating 2011 Tohoku earthquake and tsunami, being a 
geologically similar event, can provide some insight as to what damages the Northwest is 
1 Oregon Seismic Safety Policy Advisory Commission, The Oregon Resilience Plan—Cascadia: 
Oregon’s Greatest Natural Threat (Salem, OR: State of Oregon, 2012), 48. 
2 Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Region X, Cascadia Subduction Zone (CSZ) 
Catastrophic Earthquake and Tsunami Response Plan (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security, 2013), 3. 
 xvii 
                                                 
likely to endure. Intense ground shaking, landslides, ground liquefaction, tsunamis, fires, 
hazardous material spills, and building damage are some of the hazards that will result.  
This disaster would create unprecedented damage and potentially thousands of 
casualties in the Northwest.3 Estimated impacts of a CSZ earthquake and resultant 
tsunami in the Northwest include mass fatalities into the tens of thousands, hundreds of 
thousands of destroyed or extensively damaged buildings, approximately $32 billion in 
economic losses, 27,600 displaced households and almost 1 million dump-truck loads of 
debris.4 Highways and utility infrastructure are particularly vulnerable to widespread 
ground failure,5 with timelines of critical infrastructure restoration ranging from three 
months to three years.6 
Seaside has 83% of its population and 100% of its critical facilities in the tsunami 
inundation zone.7 Making matters worse is the topography of the city, which is located 
less than 17 feet above sea level. If the earthquake indeed occurs as modeled, much of 
Seaside would simply be leveled and washed away, and many of its residents unable to 
reach high ground 1.5 miles away over damaged roadways and bridges. 
With the incredible challenges of catastrophic natural disaster response and 
recovery, what geopolitical, physical, economic, social, and psychological factors 
contribute to the successful rebuilding or abandonment of a devastated city after a 
catastrophic disaster? Following this, by considering the identified factors, what are their 
impacts on the recovery of Seaside, Oregon, after a catastrophic 9.0 magnitude Cascadia 
Subduction Zone earthquake and tsunami? 
 
3 Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Region X, Cascadia Subduction Zone (CSZ) 
Catastrophic Earthquake and Tsunami Response Plan (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security, 2013), 3. 
4 Oregon Seismic Safety Policy Advisory Commission, The Oregon Resilience Plan—Cascadia: 
Oregon’s Greatest Natural Threat, 14. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid., 48. 
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The case study communities of L’Aquila, Italy; Watsonville, California; and 
Valdez, Alaska, following catastrophic earthquakes were selected to attempt to answer 
the research question. These communities have all faced significant earthquakes and 
faced differing challenges in recovery. The earthquakes in the selected communities 
occurred five years ago or longer to gauge the successes and failures of response and 
recovery actions. In exploring the communities’ experience with earthquake recovery, 
several sources of information were analyzed including scientific journal articles, news 
reports, official government documents on the disaster, and economic analyses. 
Through the study of the case studies’ post-disaster actions, insights were 
gathered in challenges to reconstruction and recovery. Courses of action were determined 
that promote decisions benefitting disaster recovery and to avoid those decisions that 
hindered reconstruction in the studied communities. 
Findings of the research were that abandonment was rejected by community 
actions in the case study communities, even in Valdez, which had to be moved from a 
precarious site. Survivors of disaster in those communities, despite their tragic losses, 
wanted to rebuild, and fought with the government in some cases to stay in their 
communities. For those survivors leaving the community, or denied the opportunity to 
participate in its reconstruction, psychological and social issues developed, which 
impacted the recovery.  
The strongest and intertwined trend in the case study communities was the 
importance of land use planning in planning for, responding to, and recovering from 
disaster. Based on the case studies and learning from the challenges they faced post-
disaster, the conclusion of this research is that land use planning, including the pre-event 
zoning and comprehensive planning of economic, residential, and industrial locations in a 
community, is critical to disaster response, resilience, and recovery. For areas subject to 
natural disaster, or other homeland security concerns, such as terrorism, land use 
planning should, pre-event, be more intimately interwoven, planning both for 
development and reconstruction following disaster with emergency management 
organizations dealing with response and recovery planning. Involvement of the public in 
 xix 
the design and implementation of recovery plans was also shown to be a primary catalyst 
for the successful emergence of communities from disaster. 
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A. BACKGROUND  
Between 2010 and 2014, while employed as a planner for the Oregon Office of 
Emergency Management, I was the lead planner for the Cascadia Subduction Zone (CSZ) 
earthquake and tsunami response planning efforts. The project was led by Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Region X and involved close collaboration 
with the states of Washington and California, federal response partners, and city and 
county governments. The project involved many meetings and conversations with 
colleagues from all levels of government.  
As the massive impact of a CSZ event was revealed, an ever-present hope or even 
assumption by some on the planning teams was that a mass evacuation of coastal areas 
(the hardest hit) would lessen the burden on response and recovery. This conversation 
occurred by planners in all phases of government, most surprisingly from local 
emergency managers wanting to force (albeit within legal guidelines) residents to 
abandon their homes so less of a support burden was put upon the limited resources in 
these coastal counties. 
This line of thought was appealing to many (including myself) who were 
struggling to figure out ways of providing logistical support for survivors over the 
shattered roadways and bridges over the Oregon Coast Range as depicted in the event 
scenario and planning parameters. This line of thought was also equally appalling to 
many (also including myself) who saw it as an overreach of state and federal emergency 
powers and detrimental to long-term recovery. Basing important recovery planning on the 
immediate response actions (in this case, abandon their homes) can be a dangerous 
concept as communities look towards recovery. This danger is magnified when decisions 
on recovery from the disaster exclude the intentions of the survivors of this future 
catastrophe or research on what the involvement and intentions of survivors should be to 
ensure revival of their devastated lives and communities. 
 1 
This research hopes to address the underlying impacts of catastrophic recovery 
faced by case study communities to determine smart practices, including the possibility 
of abandonment for the community of Seaside, Oregon, which is likely, based on the 
modeled scenario and planning parameters, to suffer extreme damage after a CSZ 
earthquake and tsunami. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
With the incredible challenges of catastrophic natural disaster response and 
recovery, what geopolitical, physical, economic, social, and psychological factors 
contribute to the successful rebuilding or abandonment of a devastated city after a 
catastrophic disaster?  
Following this question, by taking the identified factors into account, what are 
their impacts on the recovery of Seaside, Oregon, after a catastrophic 9.0 magnitude 
Cascadia Subduction Zone earthquake and tsunami?  
Lastly, what is the likelihood and consequence of not rebuilding an American city 
after a catastrophic disaster? 
C. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
This study investigated examples of past catastrophic disasters and the positive 
and negative experiences as those communities struggled to return to normalcy.  
“Should we continue to build there?” is a question asked after other past disasters’ 
it is especially more poignant as local, state, and federal governments deal with pre-
disaster mitigation funding and post-disaster emergency management funding issues. The 
goal of this research is to develop a way of answering that question through a better 
understanding of the social, economic, and cultural problems and opportunities of 
rebuilding. As a result of this line of study, shortcomings in the assumptions of existing 
response and recovery plans can be identified, and current community planning can 
consider future catastrophic events. Through pre-identification of physical, social and 
political limitations other communities have faced, proactive land use, response and 
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recovery-planning decisions could be implemented that increase the chance that 
communities can successfully emerge from disaster.  
D. BACKGROUND  
A known geologic hazard modeled to create incredible damage to the City of 
Seaside, Oregon, is the focus of this research because it is a matter of time that decisions 
on how, where, and most chilling, if, to rebuild will occur.  
Of all Oregon coastal communities, Seaside has one of the most concentrated 
vulnerabilities to damage as a result of a CSZ earthquake and tsunami. Seaside has 83% 
of its population and 100% of its critical facilities in the tsunami inundation zone.8 
Making matters worse is the topography of the city; located less than 17 feet above sea 
level. If the earthquake indeed occurs as modeled, much of Seaside would simply be 
leveled and washed away, and many of its residents unable to reach high ground 1.5 
miles away over damaged roadways and bridges. 
The CSZ, located off the Northwest coast (Figures 1 and 2), is modeled to 
generate a 9.0 magnitude earthquake and a resulting tsunami up to 80 feet in height.9 The 
devastating 2011 Tohoku earthquake and tsunami, being a geologically similar event, can 
provide some insight as to what damages the Northwest is likely to endure. Intense 
ground shaking, landslides, ground liquefaction, tsunamis, fires, hazardous material 
spills, and building damage are some of the hazards that will result. This disaster would 
create unprecedented damage and potentially thousands of casualties in the Northwest.10 
Estimated impacts of a CSZ earthquake and resultant tsunami in the Northwest include 
mass fatalities into the tens of thousands, hundreds of thousands of destroyed or 
extensively damaged buildings, approximately $32 billion in economic losses, 27,600 
8 Oregon Seismic Safety Policy Advisory Commission, The Oregon Resilience Plan—Cascadia: 
Oregon’s Greatest Natural Threat (Salem, OR: State of Oregon, 2012), 48. 
9 Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Region X, Cascadia Subduction Zone (CSZ) 
Catastrophic Earthquake and Tsunami Response Plan (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security, 2013), 3. 
10 Ibid. 
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displaced households and almost 1 million dump truck loads of debris.11 Highways and 
utility infrastructure are particularly vulnerable to widespread ground failure,12 with 
timelines of critical infrastructure restoration ranging from three months to three years.13 
 
Figure 1.  Cascadia Subduction Zone Location Map14  
11 Oregon Seismic Safety Policy Advisory Commission, The Oregon Resilience Plan—Cascadia: 
Oregon’s Greatest Natural Threat, 14. 
12 Ibid 
13 Ibid. 
14 Brian Romans, “Sea-Floor Sunday #20: Cascadia Subduction Zone,” June 1, 2008, 
http://www.wired.com/2008/06/sea-floor-sunday-20-cascadia-subduction-zone/. 
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Figure 2.  Cascadia Subduction Zone Cross Section Map15 
This research hopes to expand the breadth of knowledge in homeland security by 
providing relevant, real world based analysis of past failures and successes in recovery 
and rebuilding of communities affected by disaster.  
The federal preparedness metrics lists recovery as a key component of emergency 
response.16 The research bridges gaps in knowledge of the multiple physical and social 
layers of recovery. The research question addresses recovery of a community after 
disaster by determining if the post-event conditions exist to sustain reclamation of the 
city. This research explores the response and mitigation of catastrophically devastated 
communities by examining past historical constructs and challenges to communities. 
Through the identification of past experiences leading to recovery or stagnation and 
abandonment, insight can be gained on the implementation of social, political, and land 
use actions to provide better options for catastrophically devastated communities.  
15 Celene Carillo, “Cascadia Roulette,” January 25, 2011, http://oregonstate.edu/terra/2011/01/ 
cascadia-roulette/. 
16 Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Region X, Cascadia Subduction Zone (CSZ) 
Catastrophic Earthquake and Tsunami Response Plan, 8–9. 
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E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
1. Object of Study  
The study is focused on the economic, sociological, psychological, historical, and 
political challenges of recovery and the ramifications of abandoning a city. Patterns of 
historical success or failure of other communities that faced catastrophic damages have 
been collected from wide variety of sources and sorted into the following five categories 
selected from findings that emerged in the literature review: economics of disaster 
recovery, natural barriers to recovery, land use and natural hazard planning recovery 
issues, social and psychological stresses of the loss of community, and geopolitical 
conflicts and the “sense” of place. The literature review categories vary slightly from the 
case study categories by excluding the physical and natural barriers to recovery; the 
reasoning being that the literature review covered a wide variety of disasters and war 
across many locations. Analyzing the impact on recovery from this large amount of 
terrain variability would have yielded uncertain conclusions.  
2. Selection Criteria 
Research used academic studies, government documents, and literature to provide 
qualitative analysis of the experiences of other communities that faced catastrophic 
disasters. “Catastrophic incident” is defined using the National Response Framework 
definition as “any natural or manmade incident, including terrorism, that results in 
extraordinary levels of mass casualties, damage, or disruption severely affecting the 
population, infrastructure, environment, economy, national morale, and/or government 
functions.”17 Historical examples were chosen based on similarity in disaster and scope 
to a CSZ earthquake in the Northwest. The communities and disasters to be studied 
include L’Aquila Italy following a 2009 earthquake, Watsonville, California, following a 
1989 earthquake, and Valdez, Alaska, following the 1964 earthquake and tsunami. These 
communities were selected because all faced significant earthquakes and differing 
challenges in recovery. The earthquakes in all of these communities occurred five years 
17 Federal Emergency Management Agency, “National Response Frameworks-Frameworks 
Overview,” accessed December 3, 2013, http://www.fema.gov/library/viewRecord.do?id=7361. 
 6 
                                                 
ago or later to gauge the successes and failures of response and recovery actions. In 
exploring the communities’ experience with earthquake recovery, several sources of 
information were analyzed including scientific journal articles, news reports, official 
government documents on the disaster, and economic analyses. 
3. Study Limitations  
It is difficult to generalize the complex nature of catastrophic recovery in areas 
with differing economies, terrain, and capabilities. This study cannot address all aspects 
of post-disaster recovery. It is hoped future research could build upon these efforts.  
In addition, due to research being conducted on society’s geopolitical and cultural 
tendencies for recovery and reconstruction, a potential limitation of the research is the 
cultural and professional bias towards recovery of the literature reviewed. Some political, 
cultural, and geopolitical bias can be attributed to the American frontier and disaster 
response experience discussed in the literature review. Increased effort was taken by 
utilizing other established research of the case study communities to identify facts and 
commonalities of those communities’ efforts in recovery, which allowed the use of these 
studies to analyze the case study communities geared towards the identified factors of 
this research. The establishment of commonalities in others’ research and combining 
them with the identified study areas of the economics of disaster recovery, natural 
barriers to recovery, land use and natural hazard planning recovery issues, social and 
psychological stresses of the loss of community, and geopolitical conflicts and the 
“sense” of place allowed a uniform and ordered study of the recovery of the case study 
communities. 
Abandonment following disaster was a challenging subject to research. Most 
instances of abandoning a city occurred following rapid and life threatening situations, 
such as Pripyat following the Chernobyl nuclear disaster. Abandonment was necessary 
for the residents’ survival. City abandonment has occurred in authoritarian nations, but it 
was determined as not applicable to the federalist system in the United States. Failing to 
identify adequate case studies of abandonment following a natural disaster, a trend was 
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observed in the literature review showing a slow decline of impacted cities. This 
phenomenon was observed in two additional case studies.  
4. Instrumentation  
Information on the experiences of rebuilding communities was gathered from the 
literature review. Additional literature was reviewed on the social and psychological 
studies of catastrophe in general. The literature review was compiled showing several 
conflicting areas and unanswered concerns of the question “should we rebuild?” These 
conflicts arise in the economic, social, psychological, and geopolitical conflict realms of 
the review. By analyzing these factors and determining patterns, a greater knowledge of 
the multilayered facets of recovery after catastrophe has emerged. Research on real estate 
and economic development pressures is compiled from the historical examples and trends 
are compared to geographic information systems’ derived maps and spatial analysis of 
Seaside real estate and economic data. As a result, some insight has been gleaned on the 
potential pressure of the geopolitical conflicts from development. In addition to 
geopolitical conflicts, the study also review the role that a sense of place has in the 
community, and if the same passion for “place” exists post-catastrophe.  
5. Steps of Analysis 
Information gathered from each of the historical examples using each of the five 
categories developed during the literature review (economics, natural barriers, land use 
and natural hazard planning, social and psychological stresses of the loss of community 
and the sense of place geopolitical conflicts) to determine the overall success of recovery 
efforts from preparation for the disaster to the long-term sociological legacy of the event. 
These aspects were reviewed further to determine patterns of the effects of these factors 
on the sample communities studied. The results were applied to the City of Seaside 
(using government reports, scientific studies, CSZ response plans, land use planning 
studies, and demographic information) to determine the feasibility of a successful 
reconstruction following a devastating CSZ earthquake and tsunami. 
The literature review identified components of the psychological and social 
component to a city’s recovery, as well as the geopolitical conflicts that develop because 
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of disaster. Analysis was conducted using a program effects case study approach to 
compare the historical catastrophic disaster events against each of the identified factors 
studied in the literature review. This research method determines the impact of programs 
and infers on reasons for success or failure.18 A critical analysis of the extant literature 
has identified social, psychological, and political challenges, and solutions that the 
historical study cities faced in recovery. Using this approach, reasons for success or 
failure determined for the contributing factors can be extrapolated.  
The end result of the case study is an overall picture on how the geopolitical, 
physical, economic, social, and psychological factors of different catastrophic events 
shape post-disaster recovery. The final step was to utilize the lessons learned from each 
case study to apply those findings into understanding the conflicting social factors of the 
likelihood of success in rebuilding Seaside following a catastrophic CSZ earthquake and 
tsunami. The policy implications of the identified historical studies were put against the 
current realities of Seaside’s pre-CSZ preparations, planned response and recovery, and 
political, social, and geographical factors. Through comparison of other experiences, 
policy options can be made for decisions on rebuilding, pre-disaster “retreat” of the 
current city location to a safer location or the abandonment of Seaside based on the 
factors shown in the findings of the historical case studies. 
F. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
Chapter II is a review of the extant literature on the economic, psychological, land 
use and physical restraints of recovery, social, and geopolitical aspects of abandoning a 
community. Due to the focus on recovery following a CSZ earthquake and tsunami in 
Oregon, a review of the literature surrounding recovery planning following disaster using 
Oregon’s unique land use planning system was evaluated. 
In Chapter III, case studies on communities (L’Aquila Italy, Watsonville 
California, and Valdez Alaska) who suffered severe earthquake damage are presented to 
18 Lynn Davey, “The Application of Case Study Evaluations,” Practical Assessment, Research & 
Evaluation 2, no. 9 (1991), accessed July 9, 2014, http://PAREonline.net/getvn.asp?v=2&n=9. 
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determine how the geopolitical, physical, economic, social, and psychological factors of 
different catastrophic events shape post-disaster recovery in those cities.  
Chapter IV places the findings associated with the case study communities into 
the context of a catastrophic CSZ earthquake and tsunami striking Seaside on the Oregon 
Coast. 
Finally, in Chapter V, recovery practices and challenges faced in these 
communities are analyzed to determine what practices would best be suited to allow 
Seaside, Oregon, to recover from a modeled CSZ earthquake and tsunami, or if 
abandoning the community would be a viable and option in the aftermath. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. BACKGROUND 
The literature review was focused on the economic, sociological, psychological, 
historical, and political ramifications of abandoning a city. It was crafted using 
information collected from wide variety of sources and sorted into the following four 
categories.  
• economics of disaster recovery 
• Oregon coast-specific studies of land use and natural hazard planning and 
recovery issues 
• social and psychological stresses of the loss of community 
• geopolitical conflicts and a “sense” of place driving recovery 
The literature review categories vary slightly from the case study categories by 
excluding the physical and natural barriers to recovery; the reasoning being that the 
literature review covered a wide variety of disasters and war across many locations. 
Analyzing the impact on recovery from this large amount of terrain variability would 
have yielded uncertain conclusions.  
B. STUDIES OF ECONOMIC IMPACT AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO 
DISASTER-IMPACTED COMMUNITIES 
The economic loss and rebuilding of communities is an important part of recovery 
post-disaster. Studies were analyzed to determine the effects of recovery funding on a 
disaster and determining how quickly and to what scale economic activity returned to the 
impacted area because of recovery activities. 
The experiences in Alaska following the 1964 earthquake were of particular 
interest due to the similarities of the disaster event and isolation of communities there and 
in Oregon. “Windfalls of disaster” including the modernization of facilities and 
equipment, were described along with the incorporation of new ideas and innovations in 
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rebuilding a city and its economy.19 Examples were given highlighting the City of 
Seward that utilized federal grants and cheap loans to rebuild and modernize its docks 
and railroad facilities.20 In an interesting comparison, the study concluded that parallels 
existed with the Alaskan recovery and the economic consequences of a limited nuclear 
attack given the isolation and transportation difficulties in initiating recovery. These 
parallels led to an investigation into Cold War studies on the sociology and psychology of 
recovery following community devastation after a nuclear attack, which is covered later 
in the literature review. The 1964 Alaskan rebuilding experience was further summarized 
with the conclusion that through rebuilding stimulus, such as grants and loans, recovery 
and society as a whole become more efficient. An example was given of the state’s 
fishing fleet, after rebuilding, repair and modernization became more productive than it 
was prior to the earthquake.21 This argument has been backed up by 2004 research on 
post-disaster rebuilding in Brazil and South Africa.22  
Other positive economic findings were found in the analysis of rebuilding after 
Hurricane Andrew in 1992. Rebuilding jobs created and investment in infrastructure 
following the 1994 Northridge earthquake were credited with pulling the Los Angeles 
economy out of recession.23  
Greensburg, Kansas was a city devastated by an EF-5, 1.7-mile wide tornado, 
which severely damaged or destroyed 90% of the town’s structures. Post-event, the town 
has been rebuilt as a “100% renewable-powered city.” The devastation of the town 
created a unique situation in which they could leverage federal funding and grants to 
pursue new infrastructure technology that would have been financially out of reach prior 
19 Howard Kunreuther and Elissandra S. Fiore, The Alaskan Earthquake—A Case Study in the 
Economics of Disaster (Washington, DC: Institute for Defense Analyses, Economic and Political Studies 
Division, 1966), xvi. 
20 Ibid., 89–92. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Jesus Crespo Cuaresma, Jaroslava Hlouskova, and Michael Oersteiner, “Natural Disasters as 
Creative Desruction? Evidence From Developing Countries,” Economic Inquiry 46, no. 2 (April 2008): 
214–226. 
23 Drake Bennett, “How Disasters Help,” Boston.com, last modified July 6, 2008, http://www.boston. 
com/bostonglobe/ideas/articles/2008/07/06/how_disasters_help/?page=full. 
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to the tornado.24 Further research also echoed how disasters are beneficial to the 
economy, and an opportunity to improve the community these “benefits” were cited in 
several studies.25 
Recent work shines doubts on the disaster creating economic growth as stated in 
the research listed above. This research has shown less growth in the short term and 
negligible effects on economic growth over a longer period of time. The main argument 
of Goldstein’s research is that averaging growth over a long period of time overestimates 
the economic growth after a disaster.26 Studies of large-scale disasters in Pakistan and in 
nations affected by the 2004 Indonesian tsunami showed that severe events severely 
impacted fragile economies in these nations.27 The study had a caveat explaining that it 
was uncertain this situation would occur in a nation like the United States, which is 
capable of providing greater post-event assistance. 
It is interesting that the Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding Strategy contains many 
references to rebuilding and resilience. It touches on the relocation of properties, but 
makes it clear that increasing flood insurance premiums may cause those who lack the 
fiscal resources to make less resilient mitigation decisions.28 This uncertainty of funding, 
and the increased insurance premiums that homeowners will face, make Hurricane Sandy 
Rebuilding Recommendation 54 (“Encourage increased hazard mitigation activities in 
order to protect property against future losses”) difficult to implement for communities 
24 Shanti Pless, Lynn Billman, and Daniel Wallach, “From Tragedy to Triumph: Rebuilding 
Greensburg, Kansas to be a 100% Renewable Energy City,” American Council for an Energy-Efficient 
Economy Summer Study (2010): 2–19. 
25 Kevin Rozario, “Rising from the Ruins,” Wall Street Journal, last modified January 16, 2010, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703657604575005211595984220.html; Amy Glasmeier, 
interview by Peter Dizikes, “3 Questions: Amy Glasmeier on Rebuilding After Disaster Hits,” MIT News 
Office, June 1, 2011, http://newsoffice.mit.edu/2011/3q-glasmeier-rebuilding-0601; Bruce Evan Goldstein, 
“Skunkworks in the Embers of the Cedar Fire: Enhancing Resilience in the Aftermath of Disaster,” Human 
Ecology 36, no. 1 (2008): 15–28. 
26 Eduardo A. Cavallo, Sebastian Galiani, Ilan Noy, and Juan Pantano, Catastrophic Natural Disasters 
and Economic Growth (Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank, 2010), 30. 
27 Richard Bryant, “Managing the Psychological Effects of Natural Disasters,” Phys.org, last modified 
March 31, 2011, http://phys.org/news/2011-03-psychological-effects-natural-disasters.html.  
28 Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding Task Force, Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding Strategy (Washington, DC: 
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2013), 124–128. 
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seeking increased resilience to disaster.29 The strategy continues to report that of the 
population living in 100-year flood plain zones, 41.4% are low to median income.30 This 
finding is problematic based on research that the poor were far less likely to recover and 
are more likely to relocate after a catastrophic disaster.31 This thesis reviews the 
demographics and poverty of Seaside to determine impacts in recovery. 
Oddly, and unfortunately for Seaside, it was found that post-disaster growth was 
greater with frequent climatic disasters, such as hurricanes, than with earthquakes in less 
disaster prone areas.32 Oregon has few disasters compared to other states.33  
C. OREGON COAST-SPECIFIC STUDIES OF LAND USE AND NATURAL 
HAZARD MITIGATION PLANNING 
Oregon has a unique land-use planning program that adds legal and 
environmental complexity to the issue of rebuilding or gradually moving a community 
out of hazard areas. To determine the potential challenges of recovery, it was imperative 
to study the benefits and challenges of these regulations to land use planning post-
disaster.  
The Oregon Natural Hazard Workgroup conducted a case study of the City of 
Cannon Beach (8.9 miles south of Seaside) with the goal of preparing coastal 
communities for recovery post-earthquake and tsunami. Recommendations from this 
work included a review of zoning rules to streamline development approval, the 
identification of post-disaster land uses for coastal communities, and establishment of 
recovery ordinances to streamline the redevelopment process.34 Furthering this line of 
study, research recommended ways of increasing emergency management planning and 
29 Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding Task Force, Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding Strategy, 124–128. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Rozario, “Rising from the Ruins”; Glasmeier, interview by Peter Dizikes, “3 Questions: Amy 
Glasmeier on Rebuilding After Disaster Hits.” 
32 Mark Skidmore, and Hideki Toya, “Do Natural Disasters Promote Long-Run Growth?,” Economic 
Inquiry 40, no. 4 (2002): 664–687. 
33 New York Times, “Where to Live to Avoid a Natural Disaster,” last modified April 30, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2011/05/01/weekinreview/01safe.html. 
34 Oregon Natural Hazards Workgroup, Cannon Beach Case Study Report-Cannon Beach Post-
Disaster Recovery Planning Forum (Eugene. OR: Oregon Natural Hazards Workgroup, 2006), 1–5. 
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increased resiliency on the Oregon Coast.35 These actions require cooperation from 
county planning departments and the state land-use planning agency, the Department of 
Land Conservation and Development, to adjust the statewide planning system to meet 
this need (it currently has no emergency land-use planning criteria established). 
Identification of the pre-disaster steps to achieve this need for the City of Seaside would 
be useful further research.  
An interesting conclusion came out of Yamashita’s study of Tohoku after the 
earthquake and tsunami of 2011. He found that the centralization of Japanese government 
and society has contributed to the slow pace of restoration. Small communities are unable 
to act quickly and autonomously to disaster.36 Parallels to this centralization can perhaps 
be tied to the centralized statewide planning system in Oregon. Additionally, concerns 
have developed in emergency planning that the state land use program has no emergency 
provisions identified to allow for temporary incompatible zoning uses or post-tsunami 
redevelopment. Thus, far, the literature researched identifies this issue, but have not 
presented a solution.  
D. SOCIAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL STRESSES OF CATASTROPHIC 
DISASTER 
Research gathered showed community desire and ability to rebuild in the face of 
immense devastation and loss. Through comparison, parallels may be drawn with future 
catastrophic events, and mitigation to overcome identified challenges addressed. 
The Chernobyl accident in 1986 forced the evacuation and resettlement of 
134,000 people in the Soviet states of Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia. Resettlement was 
traumatic with evacuees feeling distressed by their hasty resettlement and the instant 
destruction of their society.37 Society identified the evacuees as “sufferers,” and as 
“victims,” further degrading the mental health of evacuees, leading them to think of 
35 Jennifer E. Pearce, “Catastrophic Post-disaster Long-term Recovery Planning-A Capacity and 
Needs Assessment of the Oregon Coast” (graduate terminal project, University of Oregon, 2008), 39–52. 
36 Yusuke Yamashita, “How Does the Restoration of Tohoku Society Begin? Center and Periphery in 
the Great East Japan Earthquake,” International Journal of Japanese Sociology 21 (2012): 1172–1179. 
37 International Atomic Energy Agency, Chernobyl’s Legacy: Health, Environmental and Socio-
economic Impacts (Vienna, Austria: IAEA Division of Public Information, 2005), 21. 
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themselves as victims and helpless, weak, and lacking control over their future.38 These 
findings were studied in a natural disaster setting with a study of the mental health of 
evacuees from Hurricane Katrina. In Mortensen, Wilson and Ho’s study, Katrina 
evacuees reported nervousness, restlessness, worthlessness, hopelessness, and spells of 
terror or panic at least a few times a week.39 With the potential almost total loss of their 
community, it is plausible that the survivors of Seaside would have similar feelings after 
a CSZ earthquake and tsunami. 
Cold War studies on the population’s potential psychological and social problems 
after nuclear war had differing results. Crisis relocation was deemed as an acceptable 
practice (for both evacuees and host areas) in a 1975 study.40 Survivors of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki appeared to have “no debilitating block to their participation in long-term 
recovery efforts.”41 In contrast, a more recent analysis on Nagasaki survivors’ mental 
health showed increased apathy, relationship problems, and enjoyment of life.42 
The experiences of Pattonsburg, Missouri43 and Galveston, Texas44 showed that 
often when communities rebuild, they do not return to their former size and influence. 
This situation is attributed to “bifurcation,” when existing systems breakdown, some 
communities (and their social structures) return to equilibrium, while others falter or 
cease to exist.45 Pattonsburg exists today, smaller, and moved from its former location, 
38 International Atomic Energy Agency, Chernobyl’s Legacy: Health, Environmental and Socio-
economic Impacts, 21. 
39 Karoline Mortensen, Rick K. Wilson, and Vivian Ho, “Physical and Mental Health Status of 
Hurricane Katrina Evacuees in Houston in 2005 and 2006,” Journal of Health Care for the Poor and 
Underserved 20, no. 2 (2009): 524–538. 
40 Jiri Nehnevajsa, Crisis Relocation: Perspectives of Americans (Washington, DC: Defense Civil 
Preparedness Agency, 1975), 32. 
41 Irving L. Janis, Air War and Emotional Stress: Psychological Studies of Bombing and Civilian 
Defense (New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, 1951), 37–38. 
42 Yasuyuki Ohta et al., “Psychological Effect of the Nagasaki Atomic Bombing on Survivors after 
Half a Century,” Psychiatry and Clinical Neurosciences 54, no. 1 (2000): 97–103. 
43 Steven M. Schnell and Gregory Haddock, “Pattonsburg Is Dead, Long Live Pattonsburg! Sense of 
Place in the Face of Disaster,” Middle States Geographer 37 (2004): 100–107. 
44 Brent Hales, Norman Walzer, and James Calvin, “Community Responses to Disasters: A 
Foundation for Recovery,” Community Development 43, no. 5 (2012): 540–549. 
45 Hales, Walzer, and Calvin, “Community Responses to Disasters: A Foundation for Recovery,” 540–
549. 
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but it is not the same in the eyes of its residents.46 This change is attributed to the 
disruption of life and loss of community that accompanies catastrophe.47 The study 
identified three steps that need to occur to maintain equilibrium and maximize 
stabilization and recovery.  
• effective planning  
• effective communication of risk  
• preparing a community with the resources to meet their needs48  
This conclusion bodes well for Seaside due to the Oregon Coast being aware of 
the risk, producing and expanding planning to deal with the event, and having an active 
citizenry focused on preparedness.49 
Beichan, China was listed as an example of a city abandoned after a disaster, 
where a devastating 2008 earthquake leveled the city that killed 50,000. Epecuen, 
Argentina was also left behind after a catastrophic dam break in 1985.50 More detailed 
studies on the sociology and psychology of these communities would be useful to 
compare to the previously discussed sociological and psychological research. It should be 
stressed that the powerful central governments of China and Argentina at the time would 
likely institute a response unlike the federalist United States. 
A hopeful end to this portion of the literature review came from a study on 
planning for post-disaster reconstruction with children. It was suggested that being 
involved in the reconstruction process is “a precious opportunity” for children and adult 
46 Schnell and Haddock, “Pattonsburg Is Dead, Long Live Pattonsburg! Sense of Place in the Face of 
Disaster,” 100–107. 
47 Rob Gordon, “The Social System As Site of Disaster Impact and Resource for Recovery,” 
Australian Journal of Emergency Management 19, no. 4 (2004): 16–22. 
48 Hales, Walzer, and Calvin, “Community Responses to Disasters: A Foundation for Recovery,” 540–
549. 
49 Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Citizen Corps,” accessed March 10, 2014, https://www. 
citizencorps.fema.gov/cc/searchCouncil.do?submitByZip. 
50 Jaweed Kaleem, “After Oklahoma Tornado, To Rebuild or Not Rebuild,” Huffington Post, last 
modified May 21, 2013, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/05/21/oklahoma-tornado-rebuilding_n_ 
3315029.html. 
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survivors to take control of their shattered communities and to begin healing.51 This final 
finding added to the mixed results of this portion of the literature review, with no clear 
pattern on social and psychological stresses of disaster factoring in on the desire to 
rebuild.  
E. GEOPOLITICAL CONFLICTS AND THE “SENSE” OF PLACE  
Sections of this literature review have alluded to an “anthropological necessity” of 
rebuilding. The geopolitical “politics of belonging” were analyzed to look into conflicts 
and power rivalries as land use plans try to place limits on development in hazard areas in 
conflict with human desire to be close to beautiful scenery. A look into the conflicts of 
rational hazard development (safety, protecting investment, etc.) vs. the sensual 
gratification of living in a dangerous but beautiful area was studied. 
Rebuilding American cities is “attributed to a mixture of economics, politics, 
nationalism and spiritual views that often sets the U.S. apart from other nations.”52 
Research in this area is important, and may serve as an underlying cause of this nation’s 
“need” to rebuild after devastation. Geopolitics is the study of power rivalries over 
territories.53 Important concepts include both natural and geologic information, and the 
demographics, and sociology of a people interacting in a zone of contact between two 
entities or social systems.54  
Modern society espouses the belief that humans dominate the world and through 
ingenuity, are unlimited in their potential to change it to meet its needs. In reality, as seen 
in natural disasters, this country is quite limited based on natural resources, topography, 
geology, and other natural forces.55 Geopolitical analysis of the United States explained 
51 Sheridan Bartlett, Making Space for Children—Planning for Post-disaster reconstruction with 
Children and Their Families (Chennai, India: Save The Children—Tsunami Rehabilitation Programme, 
2007). 
52 Kaleem, “After Oklahoma Tornado, To Rebuild or Not Rebuild.”  
53 Yves Lacoste, Géopolitique: La Longue Histoire d’aujourd’hui (Paris: Larousse, 2008). 
54 Graham Evans and Jeffrey Newnham, The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations (London: 
Penguin Books, 1998), 18. 
55 Geoffrey Parker, Geopolitics: Past, Present and Future (London: Pinter, 1998), 14; Harold Sprout 
and Margaret Sprout, Toward a Politics of the Planet Earth (New York, NY: D. Van Nostrand Company, 
1971), 293. 
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that belief in manifest destiny, and with it, ever expanding wealth and security had given 
a sense of greatness to American society. It was argued that America believes it 
succeeded due to strength rather than the natural resource bounty provided by the 
continent.56 Further, American success was driven by low cost of land compared to other 
nations, an adaptable and more easily redefined workforce based on frontier society, and 
financial resources, rather than central national planning.57 American optimism that life 
will be better, the historical experience of taming a continent and changing the world 
might explain why reconstruction of hazard prone areas occurs.58 A worrisome 
observation was made that America appears to be losing its resiliency with poor 
emergency planning and challenges of aging infrastructure. Flynn’s analysis ends with “It 
is foolish to go right back to the business as usual as soon as the dust clears.”59 
Geopolitical conflicts in land use arise between development, seeking to fulfill the 
demand of those wanting an ocean view of Pacific sunsets, and land use planning 
requiring limitations on the development of natural hazard areas. The Oregon Coast is a 
popular destination for retirement and resettlement of people leaving urban areas for the 
quiet beauty of the coast. This conflict is described in the works of Mann and Jeanneaux 
who discuss conflict from the urbanizing pressures of residential development.60 
Conflicts between development, resources (to include natural hazard area exclusion from 
development), and property rights have been described as a triangle with each component 
not allowing for complete fulfillment of the other components.61 These geopolitical 
conflicts will shape the pre- and post-disaster landscape by affecting the potential 
56 Stratfor Analysis. The Geopolitics of the United States, Part 2: American Identity and the Threats of 
Tomorrow (Austin, TX: Stratfor Global Intelligence, 2011), http://www.stratfor.com/sample/analysis/ 
geopolitics-united-states-part-2-american-identity-and-threats-tomorrow. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Stephen E. Flynn, “America the Resilient: Defying Terrorism and Mitigating Natural Disasters,” 
Foreign Affairs (March/April 2008): 2–8. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Carsten Mann and Philippe Jenneaux, “Two Approaches for Understanding Land-Use Conflict to 
Improve Rural Planning and Management,” Journal of Rural and Community Development 4, no. 1 (2009): 
118–141. 
61 David R. Godschalk, “Land Use Planning Challenges-Coping with Conflicts in Visions,” Journal of 
the American Planning Association 70, no. 1 (2004): 5–13. 
 19 
                                                 
physical, economic, and social impact of a catastrophic disaster. The flip side of the 
development conflict is the sense of place and desirability of living on the coast. Studies 
have shown the effect of “place” on lakefront property extending beyond property 
owners’ own homes. The greater value that a property owner puts on the lake (the 
environment), the greater the affinity and mental worth their properties had in the 
property owner’s view.62 With this sense of attachment for property, research is 
challenged to find connections between this affinity and a sense of potential post-disaster 
tribalism,63 in which the sense of place of landowner conflicts with responders not from 
the disaster area moving them off their property and imposing restrictive land use and 
development standards limiting their reconstruction. 
An “anthropological necessity” exists of bringing life back to an empty town and 
restoring the pre-disaster social order.64 Echoes of this line of thought appeared 
throughout the literature reviewed. The tendency to rebuild in America is a “mixture of 
economics, politics, nationalism and spiritual views,” which promotes a sense of 
resilience, renewal, and improvement to the destruction.65  
Research on evacuee attachment to the home community from the 1953 flooding 
in Holland showed that evacuees forced from their homes wanted to return as quickly as 
possible. Evacuees associated mostly with fellow evacuees, and did not fit into the host 
community.66 This research was backed by studies of survivors in Cassino and Nagasaki 
preferring to return to the damaged community rather than be evacuated.67 Centralia, 
Pennsylvania was mostly evacuated after an underground coal seam fire in 1962 led to 
62 Bradley S. Jorgenson and Richard C. Stedman, “A Comparative Analysis of Predictors of Sense of 
Place Dimensions: Attachment to, Dependence on, and Identification with Lakeshore Properties,” Journal 
of Environmental Management 79, no. 3 (November 2005): 316–327. 
63 Yves Lacoste, “Rivalries for Territory,” Geopolitics 5, no. 2 (2007): 120–158. 
64 Maxim Alexandrovich Kudryashov, “Urban Abandonments: An Anthropological View.”Second 
International Conference of Young Urban Researchers, Lisbon, Portugal, October 11–14, 2011 (Lisbon: 
Centro de Investigação e Estudos de Sociologia (CIES-IUL), Instituto Universitário de Lisboa (ISCTE-
IUL), 2011), 7. 
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safety concerns. The dozen or so remaining residents of Centralia continue to maintain 
their homes, lawns, and the town cemetery simply because they identify Centralia as 
“home.”68  
The most tragic literature reviewed was a 1976 study on the people of Buffalo 
Creek Hollow, West Virginia who suffered a flood of coal slurry that devastated the area 
in 1972. Interviews were centered on the loss of neighborhoods, and a sense of place.69 
The shock and horror of communal loss abounds in his work. Relatable text to this 
literature view includes “one is very apt to feel adrift….” and “A world without stable 
points of reference is a world in ruins.”70 One aspect of Erikson’s work was fact that the 
numbers of victims of the disaster were more than non-victims.71 It was found that 
“disasters do not generally have disabling emotional consequences or leave numbing 
mental health problems among any large numbers of their victims.”72 They suggest that 
victims are out-numbered by non-victims in this situation, which allows for a re-
absorption of victims into the community. Seaside would face a similar fate, with those 
affected by the disaster outnumbering non-victims, which may affect the type and speed 
of reconstruction, or even the will to do so. 
68 Associated Press, “After 50 Years, Fires Still Burns Underneath PA Town.,” USA Today, last 
modified May 26, 2012, http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/story/2012-05-25/fire-still-burns-in-
centralia/55213824/1. 
69 Kai T. Erikson, Everything in It’s Path: Destruction of Community in the Buffalo Creek Flood 
(New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 1976), 14. 
70 Ibid., 257. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Enrico L. Quarantelli, and Russel R Dynes, Images of Disaster Behavior: Myths and Consequences, 
(Columbus. OH: The Ohio State University, Disaster Research Center, 1973), 17. 
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III. CASE STUDY DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS 
A. HISTORICAL CATASTROPHIC DISASTER CASE STUDY #1—THE 
L’AQUILA, ITALY, EARTHQUAKE OF 2009 
1. Background 
A 6.3 magnitude earthquake occurred in the Abruzzo region of Italy (depicted in 
Figure 3) on April 6, 2009 that severely impacted the capital of the region, the city of 
L’Aquila, located approximately 90 minutes east of Rome. Several strong aftershocks 
added to the destruction. As a result of the earthquake, 308 persons were killed and over 
1,500 injured. The center of the city was entirely destroyed and much of the town 
infrastructure (including university buildings of newer, supposedly more stringent 
building materials). The event displaced over 67,000 people with 44,000 people left 
homeless as a result of the event. Approximately 100,000 buildings were severely 
damaged or destroyed. Survivors were forced into temporary tent communities set up 
near their destroyed homes, or relocated to hotels away from the impacted area.73  
73 David E. Alexander, “Mortality and Morbidity Risk in the L’Aquila, Italy, Earthquake of 6 April 
2009 and Lessons to Be Learned,” In Advances in Natural and Technological Hazards Research, ed. Robin 
S. Spense and E. Ho (Berlin: Springer, 2011), ch. 13, 185–197. 
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Figure 3.  Location Map of L’Aquila, Italy74 
The Italian government immediately dispatched large amounts of rescue, 
humanitarian, and military support to the region. Without the infusion of outside 
resources, the event’s impact to the citizens of Abruzzo would have been much more 
severe. The Italian military was credited with re-establishing the capabilities of the 
severely damaged trauma center and evacuating seriously injured citizens to outside of 
the region.75 By all accounts studied, the coordination and implementation of the 
response to the disaster was impressive. Within days, Italian Civil Authorities had 
deployed 12,000 rescue and relief workers from across the country and the European 
Union.76 
In the days following the initial rescue operations, due to debris and safety 
concerns, most of L’Aquila’s downtown (as depicted in Figures 4 and 5) was cordoned 
off and declared “Zona Rossa” (“Red Zone”). Residents were allowed only limited (or in 
74 Created by author using Bing Maps online map tool.  
75 David E. Alexander, “The L’Aquila Earthquake of 6 April 2009 and Italian Government Policy of 
Disaster Response,” Journal of Natural Resources Policy Research 2, no. 4 (2010): 325–342. 
76 Natural Environment Research Council (U.K.), “L’Aquila Earthquake—A Year On,” last modified 
June 28, 2010, http://planetearth.nerc.ac.uk/features/story.aspx?id=753. 
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many cases, none at all) access to their damaged homes.77 As of 2013, the area is still 
mostly off limits, as described by Baldini, “On balconies and in windows of uninhabited 
homes, washing still hangs from some lines. It is only when you look closely that you see 
it is faded and twisted around the string from being exposed to the elements over the past 
four years.”78 This vivid image of the long-empty and restricted downtown of L’Aquila 
results from economic, planning, geopolitical, and social issues as described further in 
this case study. 
 
Figure 4.  L’Aquila, Italy, City Center Earthquake Damage79  
77 Alexander, “The L’Aquila Earthquake of 6 April 2009 and Italian Government Policy of Disaster 
Response,” 325–342. 
78 Luisa Baldini. “L’Aquila After the Earthquake: Why Flags Do Not Fly,” BBC, last modified June 
25, 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-22986058. 
79 Wall Street Journal, “Quake Devastates L’Aquila,” April 6, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/news/ 
articles/SB123900072556892085.  
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Figure 5.  L’Aquila, Italy, “Zona Rossa” Restricted Areas 201180 
Studies comparing American and Italian disaster response showed that both 
nations responded quickly and decisively to the disasters. Another positive for both 
nations was the involvement of volunteers in response and recovery. The areas in which 
the United States and Italy differed were that surveys showed that Americans were better 
80 Corrado Mastropietro, L’Aquila, Cartografia della Zona Rossa—6aprile.it, April 19, 2011, 
http://www.6aprile.it/documenti/2011/04/19/l%E2%80%99aquila-cartografia-della-zona-rossa.html. 
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aware of recovery options while Italians had a far less understanding that led to delays in 
recovery.81 This study was confirmed by the events in L’Aquila. 
2. Data and General Analysis 
a. Economic Impacts and Financial Support for Recovery 
The earthquake has been estimated to have cost Italy an estimated €4 billion 
Euros in economic losses.82 
The initial success of the response to the earthquake gave a vision of control of 
the disaster to Italians and the global community. The reality was that the momentum of 
the national government response, erosion of local control, and exclusion of local 
interests slowed recovery.83 The historic center of L’Aquila is still unoccupied, with 
recovery efforts in the red zone not proceeding beyond the stabilization of damaged 
buildings and removal of some rubble. According to Cassachia et al., the residents of the 
city center “despair of ever returning” to their homes and businesses.84 
Responsibilities for reconstruction were handled over to the Abruzzo regional 
government but funding for recovery was nationally controlled.85 This governmental 
disconnect has led to additional delays in reconstruction. Studying the vulnerability of 
concrete structures, Liel and Lynch found that one year after the earthquake, only 23% of 
buildings outside of the city center were being repaired.86 The city center has had a much 
more difficult time in recovery as it is governed by different ordinances and has been 
81 Fausto Marincioni, “A Cross-Cultural Analysis of Natural Disaster Response: The Northwest Italy 
Floods of 1994 Compared to the U.S. Midwest Floods of 1993,” International Journal of Mass 
Emergencies and Disasters 19, no. 2 (2001): 209–239. 
82 Anna Longhini, The L’Aquila Earthquake: Assessing the EU and Italian Intervention: Proceedings 
of the EU Policies for Disaster Prevention, Relief and Post-Disaster Reconstruction Workshop, Johannes 
Gutenberg Universität, Mainz Germany, March 11–16, 2013 (Mainz: European Consortium for Political 
Research, 2013), 1–18. 
83 Massimo Casacchia, Rocco Pollice, and Rita Roncone, “The Narrative Epidemiology of L’Aquila 
2009 Earthquake,” Journal of Epidemiology and Psychiatric Sciences 21, no. 1 (March 2012): 13–21. 
84 Ibid. 
85 Alexander, “The L’Aquila Earthquake of 6 April 2009 and Italian Government Policy of Disaster 
Response,” 325–342. 
86 Abbie B. Liel and Kathryn P. Lynch, “Vulnerability of Reinforced Concrete Frame Buildings and 
Their Occupants in the 2009 L’Aquila Earthquake,” Natural Hazard Review 13, no. 1 (2012): 1–16. 
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cordoned off for years.87 In 2010, only about half of residents were still trying to 
determine how and if they would be able to rebuild.88  
Damage to the city center has exacerbated an economy dealing with high 
unemployment and recession prior to the earthquake.89 It was estimated that 26,000 were 
unemployed because of the earthquake. The initial boom in construction work failed to 
translate into an expansion of the general revitalization of the economy. The L’Aquila 
experience followed the boom and bust model described in the research of Haas et al.,90 
which caused economic stagnation and an outmigration of workers to areas with better 
job outlooks.91 L’Aquila suffered a 66% loss of local tax revenue following the 
earthquake.92 This funding loss and stalled infrastructure repairs that has deterred 
businesses from returning has created a vicious cycle of cause and effect from which 
L’Aquila is struggling to break out. L’Aquila has yet to recover fully from the earthquake 
with the per capita GDP is now around 80% of the national average and below the 
regional average.93 
Housing reconstruction has been primarily focused on new housing projects 
located outside of the city. Rather than temporary housing, such as trailers used in the 
United States while reconstruction occurs, Italian authorities decided to construct 
permanent housing complexes known as the Complessi Antisismici Sostenibili ed 
Ecocompatibili94 (CASE) project.95 The CASE project consists of 185 buildings with a 
87 Alexander, “The L’Aquila Earthquake of 6 April 2009 and Italian Government Policy of Disaster 
Response,” 325–342. 
88 Ibid. 
89 Ibid.  
90 J. Eugene Haas, Robert W. Kates, and Martyn J. Bowden, Reconstruction Following Disaster 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1977). 
91 David Alexander, “Models of Social Vulnerability to Disasters,” Revista Crítica de Ciências Sociais 
4, no. 4 (2012), http://rccsar.revues.org/412. 
92 David Alexander, “An Evaluation of Medium-Term Recovery Processes After the 6 April 2009 
Earthquake in L’Aquila, Central Italy,” Environmental Hazards 12, no. 1 (2013): 60–73. 
93 Alexander, “The L’Aquila Earthquake of 6 April 2009 and Italian Government Policy of Disaster 
Response,” 325–342. 
94 English translation—anti-seismic, sustainable and environmentally friendly structures. 
95 Liel and Lynch, “Vulnerability of Reinforced Concrete Frame Buildings and Their Occupants in the 
2009 L’Aquila Earthquake,” 1–16. 
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total of 4,600 fully furnished and initially rent-free apartment located around the city. The 
project is capable of housing 15,000 residents. The buildings were not intended for 
survivors to live in indefinitely; eventually, the reconstruction plans call for them to be 
reused as dormitories as the university expands.96 CASE construction was completed in 
2010 with approximately $1.4 billion dollars U.S. being dedicated to the project. The 
problem with CASE is that the project did not consider local needs or reconstruction 
plans when it was created.97  
L’Aquila’s recovery became a platform in Italian elections. Promises made by 
Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi of free housing for survivors won needed votes in 
Abruzzo, but also extended the dependency on federal recovery efforts. Alexander noted, 
“the more substantial, integral, and comfortable one makes the temporary housing, the 
less incentive there is to reconstruct permanent accommodation. Moreover, the neglect of 
the economy and infrastructure failed to kick-start any indigenous form of recovery.”98 
The Italian government continued to play a primary role in the preliminary 
recovery and reconstruction of the region, and excluded local involvement.99 This 
approach was heavily apparent in the implementation of the CASE project. While the 
national approach provided assistance and resources to L’Aquila, it also added friction 
between local and federal governments and an additional layer of complexity to 
recovery.100 
b. Natural Barriers to Recovery 
Central Italy has a long history of earthquakes. Part of L’Aquila is in an area that 
geologically magnifies seismic effects. Since the 14th century, the town has been hit by 
96 G. M. Calvi and V. Spaziante, “Reconstruction Between Temporary and Definitive: The CASE 
Project,” Progettazione Sismica 21, no. 1 (2009): 221–250. 
97 Longhini, The L’Aquila Earthquake: Assessing the EU and Italian Intervention: proceedings of the 
EU Policies for Disaster Prevention, Relief and Post-Disaster Reconstruction Workshop, 1–18. 
98 Alexander, “The L’Aquila Earthquake of 6 April 2009 and Italian Government Policy of Disaster 
Response,” 325–342. 
99 Alexander, “Mortality and Morbidity Risk in the L’Aquila, Italy, Earthquake of 6 April 2009 and 
Lessons to Be Learned,” 185–197. 
100 Ibid.  
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eight major earthquake events. On February 2, 1703, the region, and the city of L’Aquila, 
suffered a tremendous (estimated at 6.9 magnitude) earthquake killing an estimated 
10,000 people and destroying much of the city.101 An earthquake struck the region (but 
not affecting the city of L’Aquila) in 1915. This event also caused severe casualties 
(killing 32,000 people, including 10,700 [94% of the population]) in the town of 
Avezzano, 50 km south of L’Aquila. Smaller earthquakes have occurred frequently, and 
the populous prepared for such events; however, the intensity of the event in April 2009 
is rare.102  
A physical obstacle to recovery was the topography adding to the dispersal of the 
population. A third found short-term shelter in tents or with family away from the event 
and the rest found shelter in hotels. Most of the hotels were located at Adriatic Sea 
resorts, a long distance from L’Aquila and separated from the Gran Sasso Mountain, the 
highest in Central Italy. The geography of the area may have given a sense of separation 
from L’Aquila that would not have been as apparent in flatter terrain. The dispersed 
population sheltered a long distance from their homes has been shown to result in a sense 
of abandonment and disorientation in adults due to the loss of community.103 The 
distance from home has had less of an impact on children due to the artificial social 
structure of schools and routine established in the evacuation areas.104  
c. Land Use and Mitigation Planning Recovery Issues 
As previously described, the main focus of recovery housing was the CASE 
project, despite prefabricated structures being donated that would allow residents to be 
closer to their homes and neighborhoods. Survivors lived in tents and hotels for almost 
101 Paulo F. Galli, Fabrizio Galadini, and F. Calzoni, “Surface Faulting in Norcia (Central Italy): A 
Paleoseismological Perspective,” Tectonophysics 403, no. 1–4 (2005): 117–130. 
102 Manuela Farinosi and Emiliano Trere, “Inside the “People of the Wheelbarrows:” Participation 
Between Online and Offline Dimension in the Post-quake Social Movement,” The Journal of Community 
Informatics 6, no. 3 (2010), http://ci-journal.net/index.php/ciej/article/view/761/639. 
103 Alexander, “An Evaluation of Medium-Term Recovery Processes After the 6 April 2009 
Earthquake in L’Aquila, Central Italy,” 60–73. 
104 Ibid. 
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seven months before being resettled in the CASE apartments.105 The decision to forgo 
temporary housing is understandable, with remnants of temporary housing and 
prefabricated homes located in Messina, Avezzano, and in Western Sicily following 
earthquakes in 1908, 1915 and 1968, respectively.106 
On a positive note, the complexes were seismically sound and built with quality 
materials. Residents, who had little, were given all the basic necessities for a home 
including cookware and bed linens to enable a temporary home to be reestablished.107 
The CASE project went to great lengths and costs on landscaping and creating communal 
areas in the complexes.108 This effort, while respectful of some survivors’ needs for 
community, has failed by not including the community in its design. It has been noted by 
Alexander regarding the closure and abandonment of the city center after the earthquake 
that “It’s not clear how much (of the historical communal places and structure) of this can 
be recovered. At worst the closure might represent a form of forced migration.”109 
Despite these successes, other key land use planning considerations were ignored 
or not completed. All the CASE complexes were constructed on environmental 
conservation lands outside of the city. These transitional areas did not have the 
infrastructure to support such development with some of the CASE structures poorly 
designed sanitary systems discharging raw sewage directly into the river.110  
Another design flaw of the CASE project was the fact that the complexes were 
located away from amenities, away from the city center, and distant from their devastated 
105 Calvi and Spaziante, “Reconstruction Between Temporary and Definitive: The CASE Project,” 
221–250. 
106 Alexander, “The L’Aquila Earthquake of 6 April 2009 and Italian Government Policy of Disaster 
Response,” 325–342. 
107 Calvi, and Spaziante, “Reconstruction Between Temporary and Definitive: The CASE Project,” 
221–250. 
108 Alexander, “An Evaluation of Medium-Term Recovery Processes After the 6 April 2009 
Earthquake in L’Aquila, Central Italy,” 60–73. 
109 Ibid. 
110 Alexander, “The L’Aquila Earthquake of 6 April 2009 and Italian Government Policy of Disaster 
Response,” 325–342. 
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homes.111 Only one of the CASE project sites was located in the city of L’Aquila. Some 
are located up to 15–16 km (between 9 and 10 miles) away from the city. The CASE 
projects serve up to 2,500 people but the structures have limited services, such as 
shopping and limited public transportation to access commercial areas, medical facilities, 
or government services elsewhere.112 
Reconstruction in the city center was extremely limited until 2012. Recovery was 
focused on the construction of the CASE project homes and other controversial housing 
projects built on the outskirts of the city.113 Civic structures were left in ruins while 
outside reconstruction plans, fueled by reconstruction monies, called for the construction 
of a large-scale shopping mall and underground parking lot under the Cathedral and 
piazza. This lack of concern for civic structures and necessities for reconstruction greatly 
angered residents who were still living in transitional housing114 and opposed to new 
construction outside of the city center. 
Local and national leaders had the belief that the rebuilding of homes was the 
primary importance of the recovery efforts. As the recovery dragged on, interviews with 
those local leaders still spoke about recovery of individual housing, but their comments 
also echoed the frustration of survivors that the CASE project and temporary 
reconstruction (such as stabilization efforts) have been happening at a much higher rate 
than the reconstruction of homes.115 Other complaints had arisen regarding the 
complexity and confusion on construction standards and planning requirements. Conflict 
and confusion also occurred due to the prioritization of repairs and perceived favoritism 
in the absence of a comprehensive reconstruction plan.116 Despite the issues of a lack of a 
111 Alexander, “The L’Aquila Earthquake of 6 April 2009 and Italian Government Policy of Disaster 
Response,” 325–342. 
112 Alexander, “An Evaluation of Medium-Term Recovery Processes After the 6 April 2009 
Earthquake in L’Aquila, Central Italy,” 60–73. 
113 Ermanno Rivetti, “L’Aquila Staggers Towards Recovery on Fourth Anniversary of Quake,” The 
Art Newspaper, last modified April 1, 2013, http://www.theartnewspaper.com/articles/LAquila+staggers+ 
towards+recovery+on+fourth+anniversary+of+quake/29280. 
114 Ibid. 




                                                 
comprehensive recovery plan, schools, hospitals and government buildings for the most 
part were rebuilt with priority to show that, as an interviewee of Alexander put it, “life 
goes on.”117 Still, L’Aquila’s leaders stated that some schools were not repaired because 
as one put it, he “does not see a future for the youth.”118 The concern of local and 
national leaders regarding the reconstruction was that significant delay occurred in the 
speed of the reconstruction of critical buildings (such as police stations).119 Direr in their 
view was that limited attention was paid to the reconstruction of cultural and historic 
landmarks, and a complete lack of concern for the establishment of “productive business 
activities,” and commercial and industrial structures, which they saw as critical for long-
term recovery.120 
Italy’s regional risk reduction policies appear inadequate. Below the regional 
governments, only a small number of Italian municipalities have comprehensive disaster 
reduction (mitigation) plans.121  
d. The Social and Psychological Stresses of the Loss of Community 
Italian emergency response and recovery is handled primarily through The Civil 
Protection Department (Dipartimento della Protezione Civile). In times of disaster, the 
structure and governance of the department calls for a system of control consisting of 
local, regional, and national responses. Officially, local leadership plays the primary role, 
but the ability of local governments to respond is variable across the nation, and some 
municipalities may cede control of the response to the Italian government. Recovery 
efforts are handled on a case-by-case basis, which can impact the amount of post-disaster 
funding dramatically.122  
117 Alexander, “The L’Aquila Earthquake of 6 April 2009 and Italian Government Policy of Disaster 
Response,” 325–342. 
118 Ibid. 
119 Abbie B. Liel et al., “Perceptions of Decision-Making Roles and Priorities Affecting Rebuilding 
After Disaster: the Example of L’Aquila, Italy,” Earthquake Spectra 29, no. 3 (2013): 843–868. 
120 Ibid. 
121 Alexander, “An Evaluation of Medium-Term Recovery Processes After the 6 April 2009 
Earthquake in L’Aquila, Central Italy,” 60–73. 
122 Alexander, “Mortality and Morbidity Risk in the L’Aquila, Italy, Earthquake of 6 April 2009 and 
Lessons to Be Learned,” 185–197. 
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Prior to the earthquake, Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi’s administration sought 
to strengthen and expand the role of the Italian government in disaster response.123 In the 
chaos of the L’Aquila response, The Department of Civil Protection assumed much of the 
response decisions including the order to evacuate L’Aquila and the early recovery work, 
which set into motion a system in which local decisions were ignored, and L’Aquila’s 
citizen concerns and needs overlooked.124 The primary failure in Italian planning, 
management, and execution for emergencies has been observed to be the coordination 
with local and regional governments. Overly complex regulations and guidelines also 
have hampered disaster response and recovery. This tension between local and federal 
governments only increased, as a major federal response was needed in the L’Aquila 
recovery.125 
The involvement of the local populace in recovery and restoration of their 
community was very limited. This lack of involvement not only led to friction between 
federal emergency managers and the public, but also failed to capitalize on the “precious 
opportunity” for children and adult survivors to take control of their shattered 
communities and to begin healing as described by Bartlett.126 Other studies of the healthy 
aspects of rebuilding after trauma have found that communities can create new 
opportunities and innovation in rebuilding, greater compassion towards each other, 
personal strength to recover emotionally, a fuller appreciation of life, and a greater 
spiritual life and understanding.127 The failure of the L’Aquila response and recovery to 
use local efforts as a leading force, amplified with external assistance, led to the 
123 Alexander, “Mortality and Morbidity Risk in the L’Aquila, Italy, Earthquake of 6 April 2009 and 
Lessons to Be Learned,” 185–197. 
124 Alexander, “The L’Aquila Earthquake of 6 April 2009 and Italian Government Policy of Disaster 
Response,” 325–342. 
125 Ibid. 
126 Bartlett, Making Space For Children—Planning for Post-Disaster Reconstruction with Children 
and Their Families. 
127 Lawrence G. Calhoun and Richard G. Tedeschi, The Handbook of Posttraumatic Growth: 
Research and Practice (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2006). 
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described recovery challenges and a sense that survivors had no control over their 
plight.128  
Homeless survivors temporarily housed in camps were made to feel as if their 
plight is overstated as Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi caused a controversy when he 
said, in an interview that L’Aquila’s survivors should consider their situation like a 
“camping weekend”—”They have everything they need, they have medical care, hot 
food... Of course, their current lodgings are a bit temporary. But they should see it like a 
weekend of camping.”129  
High levels of psychological distress were found in 65.6% of the residents 
studied.130 In the transitional shelter that followed the hotel and tent phase, domestic 
violence, substance abuse, and other social pathologies increased significantly.131 In the 
transitional housing developments, other social and psychological consequences resulted 
directly from the lack of attention to social structure and networks.  
Residents had an enhanced sense of “isolation, abandonment and 
powerlessness.”132 Women, the unemployed, and elderly were particularly at risk of high 
levels of post-traumatic stress, anxiety, and depression.133 Immigrants also felt 
discrimination as the degradation of social structure gave rise to the belief that non-
Italians benefitted the most in the reconstruction and re-assignment of housing.134 As 
discussed in the natural barriers to recovery section of the L’Aquila research, evacuated 
128 Vicki Bier, “Hurricane Katrina as a Bureaucratic Nightmare,” in On Risk and Disaster: Lessons 
from Hurricane Katrina, ed. Robert J. Daniels, Donald F. Kettl, and Howard Kunreuther (Philadelphia, PA: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006), 243–254. 
129 John Hooper, “Berlusconi: Italy Earthquake Victims Should View Experience As Camping 
Weekend,”The Guardian.com, last modified April 8, 2009, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/ 
apr/08/italy-earthquake-berlusconi. 
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13–21. 
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132 Alexander, “An Evaluation of Medium-Term Recovery Processes After the 6 April 2009 




                                                 
populations suffered from a sense of abandonment after prolonged separation from their 
homes. Children fared slightly better in relocated areas with a sense of routine and 
structure, such as school attendance.135  
e. The Geopolitical and Sociological Need of the Case Study Community to 
Rebuild 
As researched, the rebuilding of L’Aquila was very much mishandled by the 
Italian government. It does not appear that intentional permanent abandonment was 
considered by the Italian government, but its mishandling of the situation seemed to have 
given L’Aquila’s residents that impression. The outsider, national government response 
was unable to act quickly and decisively in the reconstruction. This inability of the 
federal government to meet the needs of the local population adequately was highlighted 
in a study on Hurricane Katrina. Bier asserts, “Entities charged with recovery 
management are typically bureaucratic structures and, therefore, may be further inhibited 
by their rigidity, inefficiency, and functional apathy.”136  
Much of the geopolitical conflict stemmed from the conflict of survivors, whose 
opinions were excluded and reconstruction efforts led by outsiders and the federal 
government. This conflict was set afire by the April 6, 2009, 3:34 PM phone call between 
entrepreneur Pierfrancesco Gagliardi and his brother-in-law Francesco De Vito Piscicelli, 
former technical Director of the Office of Public Procurement and Environment in Rome. 
This conversation was taken from part of the wiretapping presented during the 
investigation set up by an Italian prosecutor.137 
Stay on this earthquake thing because we have to start full throttle, there’s 
not an earthquake everyday.” I know (laughing). 
God forbid, poor people. Vabbuò.—(what does it matter) 
135 Alexander, “An Evaluation of Medium-Term Recovery Processes After the 6 April 2009 
Earthquake in L’Aquila, Central Italy,” 60–73. 
136 Bier, “Hurricane Katrina as a Bureaucratic Nightmare,” 243–254. 
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This morning at 3.30 AM, I was laughing in the bed.—The earthquake 
struck L’Aquila at 3:32 AM  
Me too. 
This corruption of outside officials and contractors defines the conflict of outside 
influences and the needs of locals. The wiretap conversation contrasts heavily with a 
comment by a citizen protester—“Any given Sunday we are here shoveling, we are with 
our wheelbarrows”138  
Utilizing Facebook, citizen protests against the lack of accessibility to their 
damaged homes were organized. On February 21, 2010, the “Protesta delle 1,000 chiavi” 
(“1,000 keys protest”) was the first local protest against conflicts that have arisen from 
the mishandling of the recovery of L’Aquila. Protesters hung house keys on the 
barricades that prevented their access to the downtown.139 
Protests intensified in reaction to the impression that the government and media 
were trying to present the response and recovery as a success and miracle. A week after 
the first protest, 6,000 citizens took it upon themselves to resist authority and remove 
debris from the damaged downtown.140 The protests spread virally on social media and 
the group “Coordinamento Carriole Aquilane” (Aquilan wheelbarrows coordination) was 
founded by university student, Federico D’Orazio. The goals of the coordination group 
were to address the mismanagement of the reconstruction. Its purpose was to the 
following. 
• to involve citizens in decision processes regarding L’Aquila 
reconstruction, ending the top down approach to reconstruction (or the 
lack thereof) 
• to promote transparency in the management of the disaster funds 
• to reopen the red zone 
• to sensitize public opinion about the issue of the debris removal and the 
consequent historical center reconstruction 
138 Farinosi and Trere, “Inside the “People of the Wheelbarrows:: Participation Between Online and 




                                                 
As a result of the lack of participation of locals, and the absence of progress on 
reopening the city center, and leadership of the recovery by outside interests, on July 6, 
2010, a number of L’Aquila’s citizens peacefully marched on Rome where their protests 
were violently stopped by police.141 
The geopolitical conflicts of L’Aquila’s citizens vs. outside federal forces and 
funding could be analyzed as a desire to reestablish their lives on their own accord. 
L’Aquila is their home, and their inability to mold its future after the earthquake was 
likely seen as an invasion of their sense of place. The slow nature of the recovery and 
disconnect of the populace in its planning intensified the conflict.142 A subsequent 
occupation of the city park reclaimed shared public spaces for L’Aquila’s citizens,143 and 
in organizing against an outside foe, L’Aquila reestablished a sense of place and 
community described by Castells as a “new connectedness around shared, reconstructed 
identity.”144 With the loss of L’Aquila’s sense of place due to the destruction of their 
homes and public places, increased by the community’s lack of participation in 
reconstructing new ones, the conflict was viewed as necessary to reclaim the sense of 
place.145 
Mayor Massimo Cialente took on the federal government when he accused it of 
forgetting and betraying L’Aquila’s reconstruction. Capitalizing on the wheelbarrow 
movement, he resigned his symbolic mayoral sash and refused to fly the Italian flag on 
buildings in the city. Ironically, he was forced to resign on January 12, 2014 due to a 
corruption and fraud scandal regarding the reconstruction corruption and bribery. In his 
141 Farinosi, and Trere, “Inside the “People of the Wheelbarrows”: Participation Between Online and 
Offline Dimension in the Post-quake Social Movement.”  
142 Cinzia Padovani, “Citizens Communication and the 2009 G8 Summit in L’Aquila, Italy,” 
International Journal of Communication 4 (2010): 416–439. 
143 Ibid. 
144 Manuel Castells, The Rise of the Networked Society: The Information Age: Economy, Society and 
Culture (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1996), 23. 
145 Padovani, “Citizens Communication and the 2009 G8 Summit in L’Aquila, Italy,” 416–439. 
 38 
                                                 
resignation statement, the mayor said he had “no legitimacy left,” and “I am no longer 
useful in this town”146 
Local taxes and mortgages were still collected on destroyed homes. L’Aquila’s 
citizens suffered further perceived conflict from outsiders when the Italian government’s 
moratorium on federal taxes expired in 2010. The Italian government demanded that all 
taxes be collected and repaid after that time period; only through public protest has the 
time period for repayment been extended to 10 years.147  
L’Aquila’s struggle against outside influence on the recovery of their community 
was indicative of the internal Italian geopolitical conflict that assisted the corruption of 
reconstruction and continued federal paternalism of Italian politics.148 The protests have 
attracted attention to the struggles of L’Aquila’s recovery; however, there may not be 
enough momentum and outrage at the L’Aquila experience to overcome centuries of 
historical overreach by Rome.149  
f. Summary 
L’Aquila suffered from a failure of local regional and national governments to 
plan and involve local citizens in the execution of reconstruction in the aftermath of the 
event. This failure led to economic impacts that continue to the present day. The dispersal 
of the population due to the topography and government policies exacerbated the pace of 
recovery. Elementary land use planning concepts, such as involving public stakeholders 
in development, was ignored, along with the protection of environmentally sensitive 
areas and providing essential amenities to residential developments. The remaining local 
population felt their needs were ignored at best, openly ridiculed by Rome at its worst. 
Not being involved in reconstruction took its toll on the population’s social and 
146 BBC News Europe, “Fraud Scandal Forces L’Aquila Mayor to Quit,” last modified January 12, 
2014. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-25702891. 
147 Alexander, “The L’Aquila Earthquake of 6 April 2009 and Italian Government Policy of Disaster 
Response,” 325–342. 
148 Alexander, “An Evaluation of Medium-Term Recovery Processes After the 6 April 2009 
Earthquake in L’Aquila, Central Italy,” 60–73. 
149 Ibid. 
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psychological health. Lastly, all these factors fanned the geopolitical conflict and sense 
by locals of “us vs. them,” outside forces not concerned with the local population 
intentionally adding to the suffering and humiliation of L’Aquila.  
B. HISTORICAL CATASTROPHIC DISASTER CASE STUDY #2—
WATSONVILLE, CALIFORNIA’S RECOVERY FROM THE LOMA 
PRIETA EARTHQUAKE OF 1989 
1. Background 
The City of Watsonville, California, (see location map in Figure 6) was severely 
impacted by the 1989 Loma Pietra earthquake. The 7.1 magnitude earthquake, the largest 
on the San Andreas Fault since 1906,150 struck the San Francisco Bay area, which shaked 
violently for 15 seconds. Damage was severe. Portions of the Bay Bridge and freeways 
were damaged with the City of Watsonville being severely damaged. Strict seismic 
building code restrictions proved effective in keeping casualties low; the event killed 63 
people in total, across the bay area.151  
 
Figure 6.  Location Map of Watsonville California152 
150 George Plafker and John P. Galloway, Lessons Learned from the Loma Prieta, California, 
Earthquake of October 17, 1989 (Washington, DC: United States Geological Survey, 1989), 1. 
151 Ibid. 
152 Created by author using Bing Maps online map tool. 
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The greatest impact to Watsonville was both the loss of over 10% of its housing 
(800 homes) and approximately 50% of its commercial buildings after being destroyed or 
severely damaged from the event.153 Across the city, thousands needed shelter and mass 
care support. 
2. Data and General Analysis 
a. Economic Impacts and Financial Support for Recovery 
Richard Wilson, City Manager of Santa Cruz, described the vulnerability of a 
local economy based off his experience: “A disaster does not fundamentally change the 
larger economy; it simply takes out the most vulnerable parts of the pre-disaster 
economy, the economic trends that were in place before the disaster will continue. The 
major change will be that the economic activities lost in the disaster will be resumed 
elsewhere.”154 
The recovery of Watsonville dramatically changed the economic situation in the 
city. To recover successfully, Watsonville needed to create new components and new 
partnerships. Economic recovery took a primary role in post-disaster recovery.155 It was, 
however, slowed throughout the Bay Area because of the California recession and local 
economic problems, which added issues to a slow and uneven recovery process.156 
Twenty years after the earthquake in Watsonville, commercial development lags in the 
downtown area and agricultural businesses have closed. Much of these trends were 
already occurring prior to the earthquake; the Loma Prieta earthquake increased the 
153 Vic Lee, “Watsonville Left in Shambles by 1989 Quake,” KGO-TV, San Franscisco, last modified 
October 17, 2009, http://abc7news.com/archive/7048993. 
154 Richard C. Wilson, The Loma Prieta Quake, What One City Learned (Washington, DC: 
International City Management Association, 1991). 
155 Natural Hazards Center, Holistic Disaster Recovery Ideas for Building Local Sustainability after a 
Natural Disaster (Boulder, CO: University of Colorado, Boulder, 2005), 5–18. 
156 Charles C. Eadie, “Earthquake Case Study: Loma Prieta in Santa Cruz and Watsonville, 
California,” in Planning for Post-Disaster Recovery and Reconstruction, ed. Jim Schwab (Washington, 
DC: FEMA/American Planning Association, 1988), 281–310. 
 41 
                                                 
pattern. Since 1989, job losses have impacted the local economy with 22.4% 
unemployment and a foreclosure rate nearly a third higher than the rest of California.157  
Regional economic recovery through The Association of Bay Area Governments 
(ABAG) strove to tackle economic recovery holistically by “encouraging open discussion 
on the resolution of racial/ethnic problems in all aspects of community life, including 
housing and employment. This should be a broad-based effort involving schools, lenders, 
business and civic organizations, religious and community organizations, and the real 
estate community.”158 These efforts paid dividends in Watsonville by using federal loan 
programs to advocate for training low-skilled workers and investing in residential 
reconstruction efforts.159 Secondary benefits of this approach, given the low-income 
Spanish-speaking population of Watsonville, are evident in the sociological challenges of 
recovery. 
Low-income economic issues were evident in temporary shelter assistance by the 
American Red Cross and FEMA. Due to the large number of low-income rental tenants 
in Watsonville, compounded by the inability to prove residency, vulnerable low-income 
renters in Watsonville faced conflict and economic hardships. FEMA and the Red Cross 
provided up to 18 months of rental assistance for homeowners until they could rebuild 
their homes, and two months’ rental assistance for renters. Low-income and non-English 
speaking residents unable to prove residency were given assistance as FEMA and the Red 
Cross accepted vouchers from church and community leaders along with other non-
traditional proof of residency to accommodate the population better, and to ease conflict. 
The chief lesson of this approach was that it was a better situation to accommodate these 
people rather than to continue mass care sheltering.160  
157 Kevin Fagan, “A Tale of 2 Cities 20 Years after Loma Prieta,” SF Gate, last modified October 11, 
2009, http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/A-tale-of-2-cities-20-years-after-Loma-Prieta-
3283951.php#page-1. 
158 Natural Hazards Center, Holistic Disaster Recovery Ideas for Building Local Sustainability after a 
Natural Disaster, 6–8. 
159 Ibid. 
160 Mary C. Comiero, Housing Repair and Reconstruction After Loma Prieta (Berkeley, CA: 
University of California, Berkeley, 1997), http://nisee.berkeley.edu/loma_prieta/comerio.html. 
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Watsonville was estimated to have lost close to $200,000 ($308,647.86 in 2013 
dollars) in sales tax revenue.161 This money was recovered by a six-year, ½-cent 
countywide sales tax measure in 1990 that was put entirely toward earthquake recovery. 
Passage of this measure was useful because it could be used towards reconstruction based 
entirely on local needs, unlike outside grants that had greater restrictions on their use.162 
This tax measure was fully supported by the chamber of commerce and generated 
approximately $15 million ($23,148,589.66 in 2013 dollars) for the city.163 
By 1992, 90% of residential damage had been repaired; the combination of new 
and repaired housing projects had resulted in no net loss of housing by 1994. Due to 
demand, Watsonville still faces housing needs.164 It took longer than a decade to repair 
damage from the earthquake. As identified in Lee’s report for KGO-TV in 2009, 
Assistant City Manager Marcela Tavantzis declared that downtown Watsonville has 
never been the same. “Some things that were lost were never recaptured.”165 
b. Natural Barriers to Recovery 
Watsonville has no significant natural or topographic barriers to recovery 
compared to the other case study communities. The economy and demographics of 
Watsonville were, however, a barrier that limited the ability of residents to recover and 
impeded the movement of assistance. These factors are identified in other segments of 
this study.  
Pre-event land use policies created an artificial barrier to recovery, as pre-disaster 
zoning geared to limit growth and protect farmland created difficulties in finding sites for 
temporary FEMA trailers. The city did not want to place them on commercially zoned 
properties out of fear of inhibiting economic recovery. Sites for only 85 trailers were 
161 Conversions of past dollar values to 2013 dollars were completed using the Areppim Calculator at 
http://stats.areppim.com/calc/calc_usdlrxdeflator.php. 
162 Eadie, “Earthquake Case Study: Loma Prieta in Santa Cruz and Watsonville, California,” 281–310. 
163 Ibid. 
164 Ibid. 
165 Lee, “Watsonville Left in Shambles by 1989 Quake.” 
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found on publicly owned, and church owned properties.166 This situation created an 
immediate need for housing. In Watsonville, this problem was addressed in the short term 
by streamlining planning procedures and suspending non-conforming use 
requirements.167 Property owners were also encouraged to add housing units through 
construction of cottage units on lots previously zoned for only one single-family 
dwelling. Long-term housing construction was augmented through increasing housing 
densities and annexation of new properties that could meet housing demands.168 
c. Land Use and Mitigation Planning Recovery Issues 
Prior to the earthquake, Watsonville had seismic safety codes and planning 
ordinances identifying existing hazard vulnerabilities and methods to mitigate structures 
against earthquake damage. The post-disaster recovery-planning component was not 
included in either land use or emergency management plans.169 
As a result of the earthquake, Watsonville has developed a community-based 
disaster recovery plan based on the lessons learned from challenges after the Loma Prieta 
earthquake.170 
A decade-later comparison of the reconstruction of the city of Los Gatos 
(immediately south of San Jose) and Watsonville by Rodriguez and Jones in 2009 
identified two different approaches to recovery by the cities. Los Gatos, a wealthier 
community in danger of losing its historic character, took an approach of instituting slow 
growth and historic preservation policies to save the character of the city. The end result a 
decade later was that the community rebounded well, and now has some of the priciest 
real estate in the area due to its unique historical character.171  




170 Eadie, “Earthquake Case Study: Loma Prieta in Santa Cruz and Watsonville, California,” 281–310. 
171 Joe Rodriguez and Donna Jones, “Watsonville, Los Gatos Take Divergent Paths to Earthquake 
Recovery,” Inside Bay Area, last modified October 8, 2009, http://www.insidebayarea.com/ci_13439576. 
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Watsonville took an approach different from Los Gatos. Watsonville leaders 
realized, before the quake that community change was necessary; the earthquake 
hastened the need for a downtown renewal. The focus of Watsonville’s reconstruction 
was on transforming the downtown to a government and educational center as its focus 
with the hope that small businesses drawn to the increased downtown activity would 
follow.172 The strategy was marginally successful, 16 damaged buildings were replaced 
and historical buildings were demolished.  
After the closing of the Ford’s department store, a big perceived loss to 
Watsonville’s downtown, economic recovery in Watsonville was helped after another 
retailer, Gottschalks,173 moved into the newly vacant store. The city played an active role 
in securing a tenant for the large downtown store through low interest loans. Another 
positive downtown development activity by the city was to rehabilitate a building on the 
downtown plaza and lease it to a community college campus.174 Significant federal and 
state economic assistance was needed to rebuild the community. Watsonville’s 
experience was that recovery plan development should identify all possible funding 
opportunities to be able to capitalize on them quickly after the event.175 
In the aftermath, Watsonville sought to repair and regain its historic character of 
its downtown. Public projects, such as the retrofit of the old post office (which became 
the community college campus), parking structures, and upgrades to local schools all 
utilized urban design that matched the historic character of the community.176  
Economic issues in Watsonville’s downtown recovery were impacted by the ups 
and downs of the regional economy. Pedestrian traffic and retail activity increased but 
fell sharply with the 2008 recession. The resiliency of local business owners was 
apparent, as Rodriguez and Jones spoke with downtown Ace Hardware owner Manuel 
172 Ibid. 
173 The Watsonville Gottschalks closed in 2009, as a result of corporate issues. 
174 Eadie, “Earthquake Case Study: Loma Prieta in Santa Cruz and Watsonville, California,” 281–310. 
175 Eadie, “Earthquake Case Study: Loma Prieta in Santa Cruz and Watsonville, California,” 281–310. 
176 Ibid. 
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Rodrigues, he declared, “Watsonville is a working community, not your glitzy Los Gatos 
type of community,” he said. “But downtown Watsonville has held its own.”177  
Damages to housing the earthquake were concentrated in downtown residential 
areas. Prior to the earthquake, these areas already faced housing shortages and 
overcrowding.178 The earthquake provided an opportunity to address these issues and 
promote social equity through ordinances requiring that 25% of housing repaired and 
created after the earthquake is affordable to lower income households. This strategy 
increased the available affordable housing in the city.179 
In reconstruction and replacement of damaged housing, very few Watsonville 
residences applied or received state and federal assistance in rebuilding.180 Despite this 
situation, within one year after the disaster, 75% of homes were repaired or replaced. City 
officials anticipated that many in the community would not qualify for assistance and 
created an alternative to federal and state support. By leveraging public and corporate 
donations along with Red Cross disaster assistance, the city created a fund that provided 
small grants ($20,000–$40,000) for disaster assistance to citizens for reconstruction 
efforts.181 The speed of residential reconstruction was hastened by the city’s decision to 
streamline building permits and approvals. The city took an “easy on permits and tough 
on inspections” strategy to expedite reconstruction and ensure that it was being done 
safely.182 The manager of a firm that provided repair and reconstruction permitting 
services to Santa Cruz County described the benefit of identifying what form these 
permitting actions will take pre-event. From the National Research Council’s Practical 
Lessons from the Loma Prieta Earthquake, “Governments should focus on and formalize 
the process they want to have in place when disaster strikes rather than trying to reinvent 
177 Rodriguez and Jones, “Watsonville, Los Gatos Take Divergent Paths to Earthquake Recovery.”  
178 Natural Hazards Center, Holistic Disaster Recovery Ideas for Building Local Sustainability after a 
Natural Disaster, 5–18. 
179 Ibid. 
180 Comiero, Housing Repair and Reconstruction After Loma Prieta. 
181 Comiero, Housing Repair and Reconstruction After Loma Prieta. 
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or tweak or get around or ignore normal procedures when you’re trying to move as 
quickly as possible to help your community.”183 
Even more than pre-planning for permitting, communities affected by the Loma 
Prieta Earthquake suffered from a lack of overall recovery planning. Much of the post-
disaster decisions were made without pre-planned guidance. It was noted in the journal 
Earthquake Spectra that “The lack of recovery planning in all jurisdictions is glaringly 
obvious. There are no preplanned programs, and all decisions appear ad hoc and 
characterized by linear thinking rather than systematic approaches.”184 Another issue 
with changes to land-use code occurred when Santa Cruz County, in which Watsonville 
is located, began to implement strict building codes in landslide prone areas after the 
earthquake.185 New technical data gave precedence and practical safety reasons to 
implement these actions, but implementing them after the disaster, effectively limited the 
population’s ability to rebuild, which inflamed tensions as people were trying to recover. 
The conflict was finally settled with landowners taking all responsibility for future losses 
to rebuild.186 State support in establishing rebuilding regulations along with financial 
assistance was identified as solutions to solving this issue.187 
As identified by the National Research Council, pre-event recovery planning 
needs to occur to address the following parameters identified in a study following Loma 
Prieta. 
• Well in advance of an earthquake, local jurisdictions need to establish 
overall programs for handling the recovery and rebuilding that occur. 
• The organizational structure needed to guide intensive rebuilding efforts 
needs to be defined and the rules for its operation established. Options 
183 National Research Council, Practical Lessons From the Loma Prieta Earthquake (Washington, 
DC: National Academy Press, 1994), 222. 
184 Lee Benuska, ed. “Loma Prieta Earthquake Reconnaissance Report,” Earthquake Spectra 6, supp, 
(May 1990): 1–448. 
185 National Research Council, Practical Lessons From the Loma Prieta Earthquake, 222. 
186 Joanne Nigg, ed., The Loma Prieta, California, Earthquake of October 17, 1989—Recovery, 
Mitigation, and Reconstruction, Professional Paper 1553-D (Washington, DC: United States Government 
Printing Office, 1998). 
187 National Research Council, Practical Lessons From the Loma Prieta Earthquake, 222. 
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seem to include the elected body itself, a committee, or possibly. a 
redevelopment agency.  
• Ordinances need to be prepared that will become effective automatically 
upon declaration by the governing body of the jurisdiction. These 
ordinances should cover a range of topics, some of which may include: 
• Applications deemed routine should be exempted from time-
consuming reviews and normal fees. 
• Permission should be given to use recreation vehicles, campers, 
etc., for normal living for short periods. 
• Provisions should be established for temporary use of non-
commercial buildings by displaced businesses. 
• Provisions should be made on how to handle repair and rebuilding 
in areas that experience ground failure. 
• Plans for organizational structure and procedures to be followed after an 
earthquake needs to consider that unforeseen controversy might arise.  
• As an assist in developing the organization and procedures to respond to 
an earthquake, earthquake scenarios might be used to help understand the 
various problems with which they will be confronted.  
• Arrangements should be made to obtain additional personnel and expertise 
to handle the large increase in applications for repairing and replacing 
structures.188 
Encouraging these pre-event planning decisions and protocols with citizen 
involvement using modeled earthquake impacts could limit post-disaster confusion and 
conflict as recovery begins.  
d. The Social and Psychological Stresses of the Loss of Community 
Approximately 60% of the population affected by the Loma Pietra earthquake 
was Spanish-speaking immigrants from Mexico and Central America of lower income.189 
This lower income is problematic for rebuilding based on research that the poor were far 
less likely to recover from a catastrophic disaster and more likely to relocate.190 Low-
188 Ibid. 
189 Alice Fothergill, Enrique G. M. Maestas, and JoAnne DeRouen Darlington, “Race, Ethnicity and 
Disasters in the United States: A Review of the Literature,” Disasters 23, no. 2 (1999): 156–173. 
190 Rozario, “Rising from the Ruins”; Glasmeier, interview by Peter Dizikes, “3 Questions: Amy 
Glasmeier on Rebuilding After Disaster Hits.” 
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income populations also suffer from increased disaster vulnerability, transportation, and 
evacuation challenges, and limited financial resources for insurance or disaster 
preparedness.191 Studies have shown a correlation between income level and the ability 
to respond and recover from disaster.192 Lower income homeowners and renters are 
much less likely to carry insurance against natural disasters and are less likely to qualify 
for loans for recovery. The lower income population takes longer and recovers less fully 
from disaster.193  
Watsonville took several steps to assist its low-income citizens. As described 
earlier, Watsonville leveraged financial assistance and put it into a grant program for 
reconstruction.194 This policy enabled lower income households to finance reconstruction 
of their properties and recover. Transportation was arranged throughout the city for 
medical care and to enable citizens to travel to disaster application centers to apply for 
assistance. This action increased the ability of low-income and vulnerable populations to 
receive the assistance for which they were eligible.195  
Watsonville established official roles for community-based organizations in its 
Community-Based Disaster Response plan. This action was a force multiplier in 
gathering information on the response and recovery needs of the community. The 
community-based organizations also had a role in guiding citizen input and prioritization 
of recovery projects.196  
The earthquake struck Watsonville at 5:04 in the afternoon. Watsonville residents 
saw buildings collapse in front of them. The psychological shock of collapsed buildings 
led many residents to fear being indoors, and preferred to camp in tents (as shown in 
191 Manuel Pastor et al., In the Wake of the Storm: Environment, Disaster and Race After Katrina 
(New York, NY: Russell Sage Foundation, 2006), 40–41. 
192 Robert C. Bolin and Patricia A. Bolton, Race, Religion, and Ethnicity in Disaster Recovery 
(Boulder, CO: Institute of Behavioral Science, University of Colorado, 1986), 54–60. 
193 Ibid. 
194 Comiero, Housing Repair and Reconstruction After Loma Prieta. 
195 Comiero, Housing Repair and Reconstruction After Loma Prieta. 
196 Ibid. 
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Figure 7) rather than risk building collapse.197 This fear and caution was partially 
attributed to the experience of Watsonville’s Mexican immigrants who lived through the 
devastating 1985 earthquake in Mexico City.198 The disaster experience of Watsonville 
residents, along with a sense of community and resilient social structure,199 reduced 
psychological issues as response turned to recovery. City officials showed a sense of 
acceptance towards the earthquake, and they realized that it provided opportunities to 
improve the city.200 
 
Figure 7.  Tent City in Watsonville, October 1989201 
197 Lewis Aptekar, The Psychological Process of Adjusting to Natural Disasters (Darby, PA: DIANE 
Publishing, 1993), 7. 
198 Ibid. 
199 Eadie, “Earthquake Case Study: Loma Prieta in Santa Cruz and Watsonville, California,” 281–310. 
200 Ibid. 
201 Mark Gibson, “N124.01W16.JPG—Tent City Set Up Temporary Housing during Loma Prieta 
Earthquake 10/17/89 Watsonville California, “Gibson Stock Photography, October 17, 1989, http://www. 
markgibsonphoto.com/static/16657.html. 
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e. The Geopolitical and Sociological Need of the Case Study Community to 
Rebuild 
The small-town work ethic of Watsonville was evident in a quote noted by Eadie 
that “the fact that people knew each other by their first names made it easier for people to 
be concerned with more than their own interests.”202 This statement is not to imply that 
recovery in Watsonville was without conflict.  
A study of how effective the recovery was between the lower-income, Spanish-
speaking immigrant households and primarily English-speaking white first responders 
and recovery personnel, showed conflict and perceived injustice in the recovery process. 
Language and cultural differences were also exacerbated by the general lower income of 
earthquake survivors. 
Watsonville was in political upheaval before the earthquake as the city was being 
forced as a result of a lawsuit to convert to district elections to ensure representation of 
the Spanish-speaking immigrant community.203 Distrust and political issues extended 
after the earthquake as elections were delayed. When the new city council was appointed, 
the recovery brought the community together, driven by new citizen committees 
addressing housing and commercial reconstruction. Wisely, these effective reconstruction 
committees were folded into the local government Economic Development Council.204 
Improvised shelters and campsites in city parks were set up, despite the 
availability of several indoor Red Cross shelters in Watsonville.205 These sites were 
popular among low-income Spanish-speaking immigrant community survivors for 
several reasons. First and foremost, residents were concerned for their safety, and found 
the outdoor campsites safer for their peace of mind. Confusion about building safety and 
inspection tags added to this phenomenon. English-only tags that identified homes as 
“red”—destroyed and unsafe, and “green”—safe to use were easy to understand. 
202 Ibid. 
203 Eadie, “Earthquake Case Study: Loma Prieta in Santa Cruz and Watsonville, California,” 281–310. 
204 Ibid. 
205 Brenda D. Phillips and Mindy Ephraim, Living in the Aftermath: Blaming Processes in the Loma 
Prieta Earthquake (Boulder, CO: Natural Hazards Center, University of Colorado Boulder, 1992). 
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Problems occurred with the many “yellow” tagged homes whose safety was uncertain.206 
Another advantage perceived by residents of the campsites is that they preserved family 
and social networks of survivors and were convenient to schools.207 Lack of sanitation, 
refuse, and cooking facilities initially led the county to seek to close the campsites, but 
eventually yielded to local pressure and declared them official shelters, despite austere 
conditions.208  
The conflict over the camps served a secondary role in allowing low-income 
minorities a platform to focus media and public attention on the need for affordable 
housing, led by a local health organization, Salud Para La Gente, which acted as an 
advocate for homeless, low-income residents, predominantly of the Spanish-speaking 
community.209 They argued that the city acted with cultural and economic insensitivity 
through discouraging outdoor shelters. The Justice Department ruled in favor of the city, 
but also suggested increased participation in recovery planning efforts of community 
groups.210 The speed at which Watsonville housing recovered after the earthquake lends 
weight to the idea that this political pressure was successful. In the 20+ years after the 
disaster, the city of Watsonville and its community groups continued recovery planning 
and hazard mitigation work together.211 Phillips concludes by stating that these efforts 
have helped to heal past community race issues, increased the speed of recovery, and may 
be beneficial in mitigating future disaster impacts.212 The experiences of Watsonville 
were adopted by other agencies and organizations in California in dealing with minorities 
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f. Summary 
Abandoning Watsonville was not considered as an option, but the city’s 
precarious economic situation at the time of the event presented the very real chance that 
the community could suffer severe consequences in recovery due to the scale of the 
event. 
A finding by Eadie stated that a “window of opportunity” exists approximately six 
months after the disaster. Communities need to be able to capitalize on these 
opportunities through recovery planning, and a vision of what the post-disaster recovery 
needs of the community will be.214 Watsonville did not completely hit the “window of 
opportunity,” but it was able to rise to the challenges of the earthquake and a low-income 
minority population through inclusive practices, and modifying existing rigid response 
and recovery systems to meet the needs of its residents. 
One primary finding of the Watsonville recovery is that effective post-earthquake 
housing recovery is very effective with pre-earthquake planning of the whole community, 
and its priorities and efforts following a disaster. Watsonville managed to recover, but it 
was done by trial and error in an ad-hoc manner. Identification of the limits and needs of 
a community’s population lessens the difficulties of ad hoc decisions after the 
earthquake. Having community groups represented in the pre- and post-event recovery 
planning ensures that the community’s needs are being addressed. The demographics of 
Watsonville enabled social groups struggling for low-income minority groups before the 
event to transform their activism into advocating and delivering affordable housing that 
met the needs of the population of Watsonville after the earthquake. An important 
component in Watsonville’s successful recovery was incorporating these community 
groups into the city recovery at the policy level.  
Identifying procedures and policies of planning and permitting before an event 
was identified in several studies as a key component in successful recovery. This pre-
event planning should consider the need to reassess land use policies and alternate uses of 
zoned property to accommodate the requirements of a city in recovery. Pre-event 
214 Eadie, “Earthquake Case Study: Loma Prieta in Santa Cruz and Watsonville, California,”281–310. 
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decisions on how non-conforming uses and re-zoning of properties is essential to prevent 
land use conflicts. In Watsonville’s case, it is apparent that the health of the national and 
state economy can impact the speed, method, and effectiveness of recovery. While a local 
community has little control over these economic conditions, planners need to be aware 
of how decreased economic activity nationwide could impact local recovery.  
When a disaster “redraws” the land use map and the way that a community uses 
its space, displaced people and businesses cause conflict and pressure on existing zoning. 
In areas with strict land use codes, issues similar to the Watsonville experience can arise 
when trying quickly to locate temporary housing to a compatible zoning designation. It is 
suggested that temporary zoning be created to accommodate these necessary but 
conflicting uses to provide legal temporary locations for the establishment of locations 
for housing, support structures, and businesses as recovery occurs. Pre-establishing these 
planning criteria would limit conflicts after the event and provide a forum to discuss how 
a community is going to function post-disaster.215 
Lastly, as this nation becomes increasingly diverse, multilingual and 
culture/economic class-specific outreach and information on the policies, procedures, and 
actions to be taken after an event supports the research finding that inclusion of all 
residents leads to positive recovery results. To quote Haas, Kates, and Bowden, 
“Overlooking people and their problems is tantamount to increasing the effects of 
disaster.”216 
C. HISTORICAL CATASTROPHIC DISASTER CASE STUDY #3—
VALDEZ, ALASKA, FOLLOWING THE 1964 GREAT ALASKA 
EARTHQUAKE AND TSUNAMI 
1. Background 
An immense 9.2 magnitude earthquake occurred offshore of Alaska in Prince 
William Sound on March 27, 1964. The epicenter was approximately 56 miles west of 
215 Jim Schwab et al., Planning for Post-Disaster Recovery and Reconstruction (Washington, DC: 
Federal Emergency Management Agency, 1988), 68. 
216 Haas, Kates, and Bowden, Reconstruction Following Disaster. 
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Valdez and 75 miles east of Anchorage.217 Liquefied soil from the earthquake shaking 
caused the town to slump as the stability of structures gave way.218 The earthquake (the 
second largest ever recorded in the Western Hemisphere), caused the slumping of a 1,220 
meter (.75 mile) long and 183 m (.11 mile) wide portion of the river delta.219 A large 
volume of underwater sediments displaced a considerable amount of water, which 
generated a 30 to 40 foot local tsunami that came ashore in three minutes and destroyed 
structures still standing after the earthquake shaking.220 The tsunami destroyed much of 
the Valdez waterfront and the entire fishing fleet along with it. The wave run-up 
continued into the city, which caused $15 million ($86,974,378.26 in 2013 dollars) in 
damage, and killed 30 residents.221 Making matters worse, the Union Oil Company 
storage tanks ruptured and ignited a large fire that destroyed what remained of the 
waterfront.222 
Thousands of aftershocks greater than 6.0 in magnitude and their resultant 
tsunamis struck Valdez and the rest of Prince William Sound months after the initial 
event.223 
As Valdez looked to recover from the event, it was determined that the liquefiable 
soil the damaged city was built upon was unstable and a deadly vulnerability to a future 
similar event. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers conducted research and developed a 
217 Alaska Earthquake Information Center, University of Alaska, Fairbanks, “The Great Alaska 
Earthquake of 1964,” last modified March 11, 2014, http://www.aeic.alaska.edu/quakes/Alaska_1964_ 
earthquake.html. 
218 USC Tsunami Research Group, “The 1964 Tsunami Strikes Valdez,” last modified March 11, 
2014, http://www.usc.edu/dept/tsunamis/alaska/1964/webpages/1964valdez.html. 
219 National Geophysical Data Center, “Aerial View of Valdez, AK after 1964 Tsunami,” last 
modified March 18, 2014, http://www.ngdc.noaa.gov/hazardimages/picture/show/515. 
220 Alaska Earthquake Information Center, University of Alaska, Fairbanks, “The Great Alaska 
Earthquake of 1964.” 
221 National Geophysical Data Center, “Aerial View of Valdez, AK after 1964 Tsunami.” 
222 USC Tsunami Research Group, “The 1964 Tsunami Strikes Valdez.” 
223 Ibid. 
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site on more stable geology four miles from the old town site.224 The original town of 
Valdez was dismantled and abandoned. 
2. Data and General Analysis 
a. Economic Impacts and Financial Support for Recovery 
The total amount of damage to the State of Alaska after the earthquake was 
estimated at $2,045,822,921.95 (2013 dollars); the damage to the City of Valdez was 
estimated at $49,082,540.80 (2013 dollars).225  
Recovery efforts were centered in the City of Anchorage, due to its population 
base and military presence. Despite being in a remote location, recovery for cities in 
Prince William Sound, such as Valdez, was robust for a rural area, including $37,500,000 
($217,435,945.64 in 2013 dollars) to move the city to a new location.226 This pace of 
recovery was likely due to the emerging importance of Prince William Sound for oil 
exports,227 and the fairly large amount of freight (4% of the state’s total) that the port 
handled.228  
Economic recovery was the focus of Kunreuther and Fiore’s study on the 1964 
Alaskan Earthquake. Postulating that disasters of this magnitude may be a “blessing in 
disguise,” the study concluded that the disaster created an opportunity for commercial, 
residential, and infrastructure improvements given that significant sources of grants and 
affordable loans for reconstruction were available and that old establishments were 
destroyed, which allowed for replacement rather than renovation.229 Abandoning the old 
224 Valdez Convention and Visitors Bureau, “Valdez History—1964 Good Friday Earthquake,” last 
modified March 18, 2014, http://www.valdezalaska.org/discover-valdez-history/valdez-history-1964-good-
friday-earthquake. 
225 Institute of Business, Economic and Government Research, The Economic Impact of the Alaskan 
Earthquake (Anchorage, AK: University of Alaska, 1964), 1–8. 
226 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Department of Commerce, “Great Alaska 
Earthquake, Prince William Sound, March 28, 1964,: last modified April 6, 2011, 
https://catalog.data.gov/dataset/great-alaska-earthquake-prince-william-sound-march-28-1964. 
227 Claus Naske, Alaska: A History (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2011), 241–278. 
228 Institute of Business, Economic and Government Research, The Economic Impact of the Alaskan 
Earthquake, 1–8. 
229 Kunreuther and Fiore, The Alaskan Earthquake—A Case Study in the Economics of Disaster, xvi. 
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city made sense financially and for safety. Confirming the findings of Kunreuther and 
Fiore, the City of Valdez Public Works Director Edward Martin described the event as 
“good for Valdez” when describing a “shabby” town and depressed economy prior to the 
earthquake.230 A caveat to the finding is that, even with substantial aid, without a 
population motivated to rebuild and improve their community, successful recovery may 
not occur.231  
The Small Business Association (SBA) provided loans to replace physical 
damages after the earthquake. A key change to their policy in Alaska was to allow the 
loans to cover modernization and improvements to properties and debt recovery. This 
practice was concluded to have stimulated the urge and scale of reconstruction in 
Alaska.232 This SBA practice does not exist today as requirements for SBA loans 
indicate, “Homeowners may apply for up to $200,000 to replace or repair their primary 
residence. The loans may not be used to upgrade homes or make additions, unless 
required by local building code.”233 The speed in which SBA loans were processed may 
have benefitted the recovery, and the economic restoration of New Valdez and other 
areas in Alaska.234 The provision in SBA loans to allow debt retirement prevented both 
commercial and personal bankruptcies in Alaska following the earthquake permitted 
businesses, homeowners, as well as Alaskan financial institutions that would have 
struggled to deal with the economic after effects.235 Additionally, in reconstruction, 
Valdez placed an emphasis on tourism in economic revitalization,236 a decision that 
diversified the economy and brought with it new types of income to the city. 
230 National Research Council, The Great Alaska Earthquake of 1964, Human Ecology (Washington, 
DC: National Academy of Sciences, 1968), 356. 
231 Kunreuther and Fiore, The Alaskan Earthquake—A Case Study in the Economics of Disaster, 65. 
232 Ibid., 97–115. 
233 U.S. Small Business Administration, “Types of Disaster Loans,” last modified March 20, 2014, 
http://www.sba.gov/content/home-and-personal-property-loans. 
234 Kunreuther and Fiore, The Alaskan Earthquake—A Case Study in the Economics of Disaster, 97–
115. 
235 Ibid. 
236 National Research Council, The Great Alaska Earthquake of 1964, Human Ecology, 69. 
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A common finding of research cited was that large financial assistance enabled 
Alaska to recover quicker and with improved facilities because of federal disaster aid. 
Some have argued that the federal aid has never stopped. As noted in a New York Times 
article, historian Victor Fischer, who helped to write the state’s constitution noted that 
1964 Alaskan earthquake response and recovery funding was “a tremendous boost” and 
that “we built the state with that money.”237 Federal spending in Alaska was 38% higher 
in 1996 and has increased every year since; in 2010, it was 71% higher than the other 50 
states.238 University of Anchorage Economics Professor, Scott Goldsmith, estimated that 
1/3 of Alaskan jobs depend on federal spending either directly or indirectly.239 Given the 
large amount of federal land in Alaska, the large amount of federal land ownership 
requires a large federal financial investment. The amount of federal monies that Alaska 
receives does not seem analogous to Nevada, which has a larger percentage of federal 
land,240 but is ranked 50th among states for federal funding.241  
b. Natural Barriers to Recovery 
Responding to and recovering from disaster is more challenging in rural Alaska 
than in many of the other states. Alaska imports approximately 95% of its food242 and is 
dependent on the lower 48 states for the vast majority of refined fuel and manufactured 
goods.243 The remoteness of Valdez is shown in the location map in Figure 8. 
237 Michael Powell, “How Alaska Became a Federal Aid Magnet,” The New York Times, last modified 
August 8, 2010, http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/08/18/how-alaska-became-a-federal-aid-magnet/ 
?_php=true&_type=blogs&_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=1. 
238 Ibid. 
239 Gunnar Knapp, An Introduction to the Economy of Alaska (Anchorage, AK: University of Alaska 
Anchorage, 2012), http://www.iser.uaa.alaska.edu/Publications/presentations/2012_02-
Introduction_to_Economy_of_Alaska.pdf. 
240 New York Times, “The Open West, Owned by the Federal Government,” last modified March 23, 
2012, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2012/03/23/us/western-land-owned-by-the-federal-government. 
html?ref=utah&_r=0. 
241 Molly Ball and Francis McCabe, “Nevada’s Per Person Share Low,” Las Vegas Review-Journal, 
last modified February 23, 2009, http://www.reviewjournal.com/news/nevadas-person-share-low . 
242 Deirdre Helfferich and Nancy Tarnai, “Alaska’s Food (in) Security,” Agroborealis 41, no. 1 
(2010): 23–27. 
243 Richard D. Koehler et al., Pacific Northwest Earthquakes and Potential Effects on Alaska- 
Miscellaneous Publication 148 (Fairbanks, AK: State of Alaska Department of Natural Resources, Alaska 
Seismic Hazards Safety Commission, Alaska Division of Geological & Geophysical Surveys, 2012), 8. 
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The Richardson Highway (stretching from Fairbanks to Valdez and connecting to 
the Glenn Highway connecting Valdez and Anchorage) had little damage unlike 
roadways in other affected communities. Only slight damage was reported that the 
surface of the roadway was “wavy,” which allowed the movement of relief supplies to 
Prince William Sound.244 
 
Figure 8.  Location Map of Valdez, Alaska245 
The Prince William Sound is of primary importance to the Alaskan economy for 
shipping, as Valdez is one of the only ice-free all-weather ports in the state. The 
destruction of the port in Valdez impacted interior Alaska and also reduced the 
movement of resources to Fairbanks and the interior of Alaska.246 Due to a land 
ownership and right-of-way feud, rail to the City of Valdez was never established prior to 
244 Arthur Grantz, George Plafker, and Reuben Kachadoorian, Alaska’s Good Friday Earthquake, 
March 27, 1964—A Preliminary Geologic Evaluation (Washington, DC: United States Department of the 
Interior, 1964), 25. 
245 Created by author using Bing Maps online map tool. 
246 U.S. Geological Survey, Effects of the Earthquake of March 27,1964, on Air and Water Transport, 
Communications, and Utilities Systems in South-Central Alaska (United States Department of the Interior, 
Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1967), B7. 
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1964 despite plans for doing so.247 Not having rail limited relief and recovery supplies 
greatly. 
This dependence on trade and the challenges of delivering resources required an 
airlift of supplies, teams, and resources to provide relief and long-term recovery to 
Valdez.248 Valdez’s airport tarmac and runways were cracked, but usable, which enabled 
response and short-term recovery to remain viable until increased oceangoing support 
could arrive.  
Alaska, due to extreme northern winters, has an abbreviated building season 
confined to several months between late spring and early autumn. Due to this physical 
limitation, it required creative policies to expedite building approval and management of 
the building process to allow an entirely new city to be built in four years of seasonally 
shortened building seasons.249  
c. Land Use and Mitigation Planning Recovery Issues 
On April 27, 1964, (one month after the earthquake), the Valdez City Council 
recognized the need for land use change after the destruction of much of its waterfront 
and the findings of a U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) geological report on the stability 
and safety of reconstruction. Figure 9 shows the location of the Old Valdez City location. 
A resolution was passed recognizing the need for the community to be moved to the 
location of the present city of Valdez;250 this act set into motion a rapid recovery and 
moving of the city of Valdez to its new location.  
Survivors also recognized the need to relocate, after being witness to the 
devastation of the earthquake. Analysis of locations near the city determined the best 
location was located approximately four miles northwest near Mineral Creek. The new 
247 Mohammad Jawed Hameedi, “Natural and Historic Setting,” in Environmental Studies in Port 
Valdez, Alaska, ed. D. G. Shaw (Berlin Heidelberg New York: Springer-Verlag, 2013), 1–15. 
248 Chris McCann. “50 Years Since 1964 Earthquake Catastrophe: Military Integral to Recovery,” 
Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, last modified March 24, 2014, http://www.jber.af.mil/news/story.asp? 
id=123404631. 
249 Dwight Ink, “Managing Large-Scale, Time-Urgent Presidential Initiatives,” Memos to Leaders, 
March 31, 2014. www.memostoleaders.org/sites/default/files/Memo1_2.pdf. 
250 National Research Council, The Great Alaska Earthquake of 1964, Human Ecology, 356. 
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location was built on stable geology that showed no signs of deformation after the 
earthquake. It was on higher ground and less vulnerable to tsunamis.251  
 
Figure 9.  Location Map of Old Valdez, Alaska252 
President Lyndon B. Johnson established the Federal Reconstruction and 
Development Commission for Alaska in an effort to streamline recovery.253 With an 
objective of restoring what was lost and to use the disaster as a catalyst to promote future 
development, extensive financial aid drove joint federal-state and local task forces on 
reconstruction to establish new building codes and the creation of a new city boundary 
and plan.254 Federal assistance required that reconstruction contain seismic standards, 
such as stronger building materials, flexible materials, and adequate foundations for 
construction in the new city. The plans also enabled the city to enact plan guidance for 
251 Alaska Division of Geological and Geophysical Surveys, Geologic Studies of Critical Areas: 
Valdez Alaska (Fairbanks, AK: Alaska Division of Geological and Geophysical Surveys, 1987), 1. 
252 Alaska Climate Research Center, “Old Valdez, Alaska,” accessed April 3, 2014, http://climate.gi. 
alaska.edu/history/southcentral/ValdMap.gif. 
253 Barclay Jones, Economic Consequences of Earthquakes: Preparing for the Unexpected (Buffalo, 




                                                 
fire hazards and snow removal, which allowed the new city to take a proactive approach 
to civic problems.255 Unlike the regulations against returning to their homes in L’Aquila 
Italy (2009), civil defense passes were given to citizens for access to their homes and 
property while reconstruction occurred.256 Recovery was conducted transparently in 
public meetings that involved citizen input, which fostered a rapid reconstruction of the 
new town in three years. Under the challenges of a shortened construction season, 
building standard upgrades were initiated and safer buildings were constructed in the new 
city. Mitigation of future disaster effects was given high priority.257 Strong federal and 
state leadership in requiring mitigation for future disaster safety enabled the Alaskan 
recovery to avoid the pitfalls described by Mader in which regulations and restrictions are 
relaxed in an effort to “return quickly to normal.”258 Relocation was completed in 
October 1967.259  
Mitigation against future seismic events was built into designs of the new city and 
was continued as the city continued to grow after 1967. Zoning and land use codes took 
into account areas of seismic danger and tsunami inundation. As the city grew, building 
standards continued to remember and take heed the lessons of the Good Friday 
Earthquake. The Alaskan Pipeline, a major component of the Valdez economy, was 
constructed within strict seismic guidelines.260 
The awareness and fear of developing in the geologic hazard areas of old Valdez 
seem to be fading as the time from the earthquake passes. Restrictions on building put in 
place after the 1964 earthquake are expiring after 50 years. Currently, the city is 
255 Andrew Goldstein, “Alaska Disasters AMA: 1964 Good Friday Earthquake and 1989 Exxon 
Valdez Oil Spill,” Reddit Ask Historians, http://www.reddit.com/r/AskHistorians/comments/20wt9u/ 
alaska_disasters_ama_1964_good_friday_earthquake/. 
256 Tony Gorman, “Valdez Museum Prepares Commemorates 1964 Quake,” Alaska Public Media, last 
modified March 21, 2014, http://www.alaskapublic.org/2014/03/21/valdez-museum-prepares-commemorat 
es-1964-quake/. 
257 Jones, Economic Consequences of Earthquakes: Preparing for the Unexpected. 
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Foundation, 1980), 5. 
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developing a master plan for the old town site, currently split into three zones. The most 
dangerous, Zone A, restricts all development. Zone B is less dangerous and contains light 
industrial uses. Zone C has a less hazardous rating and contains more dense development. 
As the moratorium on building expires, plans for industrial development in Zone A and 
tourism-residential development (an RV park) in Zone B has been developed. These 
plans did not come to fruition, but increased planning proposals will likely occur as the 
50-year moratorium ends.261  
d. The Social and Psychological Stresses of the Loss of Community 
The assertions by Quarantelli and Dynes of disaster survivors wanting to remain 
in their community, and are not psychologically shocked by the event to the point of 
inaction, were true of Alaskans after the earthquake.262 Then Alaskan Governor Bill 
Egan, a Valdez resident, described this assertion on an official visit on Easter Sunday 
1964 (two days after the earthquake and tsunami, and in the midst of aftershocks). The 
governor witnessed residents making initial repairs to damaged walkways.263  
The cooperation of Alaskans after the earthquake was described as a community 
bonded by a common event was also described by Kunreuther and Fiore. Families offered 
freely to house their now-homeless neighbors. The communities across the state generally 
worked together and assisted in response and recovery activities. The study described, 
“The most admirable human qualities were exhibited by practically all the Alaskan 
residents.”264 The spirit of assistance and good behavior witnessed in 1964 exists today 
in the assumptions of the Alaskan Emergency Operations Plan, which describes that 
“Alaskans will want to be helpful. Volunteers and those offering services for pay will 
261 Yereth Rosen, “Condemned No More; 50 Years After Huge Earthquake, Building Moratorium 
Expiring in Valdez,” Alaska Dispatch, March 23, 2014, http://www.alaskadispatch.com/article/20140323/ 
condemned-no-more-50-years-after-huge-earthquake-building-moratorium-expiring. 
262 Enrico L. Quarantelli and Russell R, Dynes, “When Disaster Strikes (It Isn’t Much Like What 
You’ve Heard and Read About),” Psychology Today 5 (1972): 67–70. 
263 Lee Revis, “A Look Back at Day of 1964 Earthquake Fifty Years Later, Town Commemorates 
Disaster Milestone,” Valdez Star, March 26, 2014, http://www.valdezstar.net/story/2014/03/26/main-
news/a-look-back-at-day-of-1964-earthquake/500.html. 
264 Kunreuther and Fiore, The Alaskan Earthquake—A Case Study in the Economics of Disaster, 141. 
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come forward. They will need resourceful leadership” and “Alaskans will not riot, take 
unlawful advantage of those victimized, or tolerate those who attempt such behavior.”265  
A strong sense of this community caring for the community was witnessed in 
economic interactions after the earthquake. Studies were completed that showed despite 
the scarcity of resources, community support led to non-inflationary economic activity 
throughout Alaska. Storeowners with undamaged supplies and storefronts were willing to 
keep necessities for recovery at reasonable prices for those community members in need. 
Some store managers were authorized to change prices to support the community. In 
some cases, prices were lower after the earthquake.266 Alaskans returned the favor in a 
spirit of support for their neighbors. Rather than hoarding food and supplies at lower or 
stable prices, Alaskans were considerate and concerned with one another, which occurred 
without the implementation of price controls.267 Prices remained stable in the five 
Alaskan cities, including Valdez. The goodwill support also flowed from the lower 48 
states with shippers in the Puget Sound lowering shipping rates to Alaska.268  
Rationing of gasoline did occur, not because of shortages, but for concern over 
the condition of roadways and of residents leaving the area, having the dual concern of 
evacuee safety and the exodus of the population from a devastated area. This concern was 
a prudent decision in the Anchorage area due to the destruction of highways out of the 
city.269 As described, the Richardson Highway out of Valdez was in usable condition, but 
the remoteness of Valdez made short-term, self-evacuation impractical. Large numbers of 
Valdez citizens did leave the severely damaged city when they were able to seek shelter 
on the way to Fairbanks in the Tsania Lodge (34 miles northeast) and Glenallen (116 
265 State of Alaska, Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Management, State of Alaska 
Emergency Operations Plan (Anchorage, AK: State of Alaska, 2013), 7.  
266 Kunreuther and Fiore, The Alaskan Earthquake—A Case Study in the Economics of Disaster, 38. 
267 Ibid., 139. 
268 Ibid., 39. 
269 Ibid., 14. 
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miles to the north). The spirit of community assistance continued to shine with many 
homes along the highway having signs reading that they had space for evacuees.270  
As Valdez began recovering, families left the area temporarily for safety and 
supply concerns. Typically, evacuees live close to the disaster area and return quickly. In 
Alaska, due to the extent of the disaster and the remoteness of the state, many evacuees 
from Anchorage sought shelter with families and friends in the lower 48 states, the 
majority of those in Valdez seeking shelter in Fairbanks. This distance marginally 
increased the time of return to their communities for those evacuees.271 Without large 
federal efforts to hasten the speed of recovery for Alaska, the time required for 
reconstruction would have likely increased. The lack of these efforts would have most 
likely led to a sense of abandonment in evacuees similar to that felt by the residents of 
L’Aquila Italy in 2009272 and of Hurricane Katrina evacuees studied in Houston.273  
The event allowed Alaska to rebuild not only Valdez, but rebuild its 
understanding of the geologic hazards and challenges of geography. Education and 
awareness of earthquake drills, tsunami evacuation routes, and 72-hour preparedness is 
given extra magnitude when the 1964 event is included in the discussion.274  
e. The Geopolitical and Sociological Need of the Case Study Community to 
Rebuild 
I believe that in the future, whoever holds Alaska will hold the world. I 
think it is the most important strategic place in the world.  
—Brigadier General Billy Mitchell,  
U.S. Army Air Service to Congress in 1935. 
 
270 Revis, “A Look Back at Day of 1964 Earthquake Fifty Years Later, Town Commemorates Disaster 
Milestone.” 
271 Kunreuther and Fiore, The Alaskan Earthquake—A Case Study in the Economics of Disaster, 64. 
272 Alexander, “An Evaluation of Medium-Term Recovery Processes After the 6 April 2009 
Earthquake in L’Aquila, Central Italy,” 60–73. 
273 Mortensen, Wilson, and Ho, “Physical and Mental Health Status of Hurricane Katrina Evacuees in 
Houston in 2005 and 2006,” 524–538. 
274 West et al., “Why the 1964 Great Alaska Earthquake Matters 50 Years Later,” 245–251. 
 65 
                                                 
In 1964, Alaska had only been a state for five years and was identified as 
strategically important prior to World War II by the Alaskan Territorial Delegate who 
successfully sought American military installations in the territory. This effort increased 
dramatically after the Japanese invasion of the Aleutian Islands. As the war ended, 
Alaska’s governor Ernest Gruening became frustrated that the state still lacked adequate 
infrastructure and would likely not see significant federal assistance without statehood.275 
Efforts in the state to gain statehood were given additional weight due to the Cold War 
geographic, strategic, and economic significance of the Arctic.  
When the 1964 Good Friday earthquake and tsunami ravaged the state, Alaska 
had a limited ability to respond, and based on location and supply challenges, and an 
inability to recover from the disaster without large amounts of federal aid.276 As 
lifesaving turned to long-term recovery, it was clear that wholesale evacuation was not an 
option, nor was abandoning large parts of the state. The federal government needed 
Alaska to recover fully. The geopolitical and economic importance of Alaska to the 
United States has been identified as a primary reason for the rapid influx of financial 
assistance and federal support.277  
The large U.S. military presence in the state prior to the earthquake enabled a 
faster recovery in Alaska and the strategic importance of the state was recognized as a 
driver for reconstruction.278 Alaska’s location close to the Soviet Union gave the United 
States an important outpost for defensive actions. The Distant Early Warning Line 
(DEW) was completed in 1957 and provided North America the possibility of early 
detection in the event of a Soviet Nuclear attack.279 Alaska provided detection, 
interception, and defense against attack; it also provided a shorter polar air route to 
275 Eric Gislason, “A Brief History of Alaska Statehood,” Alaska Statehood Celebration Commission, 
April 10, 2014, http://www.gov.state.ak.us/ASCC/pdf/HistoryofAlaska.pdf. 
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279 Joseph F. Bouchard, “Guarding the Cold War Ramparts: The U.S. Navy’s Role in Continental Air 
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Europe to support U.S. allies and a transition point for the movement of troops and 
equipment to points in Asia.280 
The decision of the federal government to assist quickly and economically 
decisively in Alaska, including the rebuilding of Valdez in a new location, enabled the 
state to rebuild better, but also cemented the use and continued importance of Alaska as a 
critical arctic geopolitical location. The United States has recognized the continued 
importance of the arctic in National Security Policy Directive 66, which defined the 
economic and geopolitical importance of Alaska for the United States, by describing it as 
an “Arctic Nation.”281 As the Alaskan oil pipeline was developed with its terminus at 
Valdez for export, it is likely the investment has paid dividends since 1964, throughout 
the Cold War, and the recent posturing of the U.S. military towards Asia, as well as 
increased oil exploration in the Arctic by other nations.282 
f. Summary 
The complete devastation of the City of Valdez occurred at a turning point in 
Alaskan and American history. Alaska was a new state, remote with limited resources for 
response and recovery. Without the large federal financial intervention to bring relief and 
reconstruction to remote areas dependent on the lower 48 states for food and fuel, it is 
reasonable to have expected recovery to languish, which would have impacted the future 
economic and oil production improvements that occurred post-1964.  
The disaster, along with the immense federal financial aid, provided a springboard 
for proactive land use planning for Alaskan communities. The decision to relocate and 
rebuild the city enabled the infrastructure improvements and presented an opportunity to 
re-envision the social, economic, and infrastructure of the community, by incorporating 
seismic resilience and mitigation against future devastation into reconstruction. 
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Valdez residents coalesced around the horrors of the disaster; they (along with 
others in Alaska) were generous to their neighbors in need by sharing shelter and 
resources to these neighbors. This action resulted in less sociological problems than those 
faced by the other case study communities and likely hastened recovery. 
Alaska sits at a critical geographic location for American Cold War defenses. The 
need for America to have Alaska as a functioning and economically productive state 
appears to have driven the large federal reconstruction efforts. Just as Alaska was 
dependent on the lower 48 for food and resources, the rest of the United States was 
dependent on Alaska as an Arctic first line of defense against the Soviet Union. Having 
an earthquake-shattered state with limited recovery in such a critical geopolitical location 
was not an option for the United States. 
 68 
IV. SEASIDE, OREGON, AND THE CASCADIA SUBDUCTION 
ZONE 
A. OVERVIEW OF THE CITY AND SEISMIC THREAT 
1. Demographics, Economic, and Social Information 
The City of Seaside, Oregon, (location map and aerial photo are depicted in 
Figures 10 and 11) is one of the most visited cities on the Oregon Coast due to its 
proximity (approximately 80 miles) to the City of Portland. The city has a population of 
6,457 persons (2010) and a population density of 1,641 persons per square mile.283 The 
population is primarily white, which makes up 88.1% of the population. The second 
largest ethnicity is Hispanic or Latino, which makes up 12.4% of the city population (a 
107.25% increase from the year 2000). Also, 9.4% of the Seaside population speaks a 
language other than English at home.284 
The Seaside homeownership rate is calculated at 50.7% with a median value 
home being valued at $280,800.285 The vacancy rate in Seaside was estimated at 36% in 
2010. This number is common for a tourist town, in which many of the vacant homes are 
rentals or second homes.286 The tourist and retirement nature of the city is also shown in 
its percentage (17.4%) of people age 65+, which is greater than the state average, and the 
percentage of the population aged under 18 and under 5, which is lower than the state 
average.287 In addition, 17.7% of citizens of Seaside live below the poverty level (the 
Oregon State average is 15.5%), and the median household income is $43,085 (compared 
with an income of $50,036 in the rest of the state).288 




286 City of Seaside Planning Department, Comprehensive Plan Amendment—Goal 10 Housing and 
Residential Land Needs (Seaside, OR: City of Seaside, 2014). 
287 U.S. Census Bureau, “State and County Quickfacts-Seaside (City) Oregon.” 
288 Ibid. 
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The economy in Seaside is primarily focused on tourism, with accommodation, 
recreation, and food services being the primary employers in the city. 
 
Figure 10.  Location Map of Seaside, Oregon289 
 
Figure 11.  Aerial View of Seaside, Oregon290 
2. Dire Impacts of a Cascadia Subduction Zone Earthquake and 
Tsunami on the City of Seaside 
As previously described, Seaside, Oregon, has the most concentrated 
vulnerabilities to damage as a result of a CSZ earthquake and tsunami291 (see Figures 12 
and 13). Seaside has 83% of its population and 100% of its critical facilities in the 
289 Created by author using Bing Maps online map tool. 
290 “City of Seaside Visitors Bureau,” accessed April 14, 2014, http://www.seasideor.com/. 
291 Oregon Department of Transportation Bridge Engineering Section, Seismic Vulnerability of 
Oregon State Highway Bridges (Salem, OR: State of Oregon, 2009). 
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tsunami inundation zone. Making matters worse is the topography of the city, which is 
located less than 17 feet above sea level.292 Being the closest area to the epicenter of the 
earthquake, extreme effects are to be expected. Ground shaking from a 9.0 magnitude 
earthquake is estimated to occur for up to five minutes and would result in significant 
casualties and structural damage.293 The tsunami generated by the earthquake would 
reach Seaside in 15–30 minutes and cause further loss of life and damage to the impacted 
city.294 Structures not built to modern codes are not expected to survive. Much of the 
coastal residential inventory is likely to be damaged or destroyed by the tsunami, which 
may travel more than a mile inland in places. Waves may continue periodically as 
aftershocks continue well past the initial quake.295 
Seaside is connected primarily by State Highway 26, which traverses hilly, 
landslide prone terrain and crosses rivers with bridges not expected to survive. Access by 
road following the earthquake is likely to require a month or more of continuous effort by 
construction crews and engineers as depicted by the estimated roadway damages map in 
Figure 14.296 Telecommunication, petroleum, and natural gas supplies will be either 
destroyed or depleted. Response and initial recovery will be delayed due to the 
earthquake’s impacts regionwide.  
292 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Homeland Infrastructure Threat and Risk Analysis Center, 
Draft Analytical Baseline Study for the Cascadia Earthquake and Tsunami (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, 2011). 
293 Ibid. 
294 Ibid. 
295 Oregon Office of Emergency Management, State of Oregon Cascadia Subduction Zone 
Catastrophic Earthquake and Tsunami Operations Plan (Salem, OR: State of Oregon, 2012). 
296 Ibid. 
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Figure 12.  Tsunami Evacuation Map for Seaside297 
297 Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Region X, Cascadia Subduction Zone (CSZ) 
Catastrophic Earthquake and Tsunami Response Plan. 
 72 
                                                 
 
Figure 13.  Oregon Coastal City Populations in the CSZ Tsunami Inundation 
Zone298  
298 Nathan Wood, Variations in City Exposure and Sensitivity to Tsunami Hazards in Oregon, 
Scientific Investigations Report 2007–5283 (Washington, DC: U.S. Geologic Survey, 2007). 
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Figure 14.  Roadway Damages After a 9.0 Magnitude CSZ Earthquake and 
Tsunami299 
3. Planned CSZ Response and Recovery 
The State of Oregon has developed, along with FEMA Region X, a response plan 
for a CSZ event. The mission of the response plans are to provide lifesaving and life-
sustaining assistance and resources necessary to supplement local, regional, tribal, and 
private-sector efforts immediately following a catastrophic CSZ earthquake and tsunami 
299 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Homeland Infrastructure Threat and Risk Analysis Center, 
Draft Analytical Baseline Study for the Cascadia Earthquake and Tsunami. 
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to alleviate the dire impacts of the incident and encourage the recovery of the affected 
areas.300 
The plans are modeled on the threat posed by a magnitude 9.0 CSZ earthquake 
and resultant tsunami. The scenario for this incident was developed using FEMA’s 
HAZUS—MH loss estimation program. Specific analytical information was provided by 
the National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center (NISAC), and the Homeland 
Infrastructure Threat and Risk Analysis Center Office of Infrastructure Protection 
National Protection and Programs Directorate (HITRAC), which are contained in the 
Draft Analytical Baseline Study for the Cascadia earthquake and tsunami. 
Key tasks based on the devastation of the event are to do the following: 
• unsure/protect responder and public health and safety, and to save and 
sustain life 
• stabilize the situation 
• provide for basic human needs to include food, water, shelter, and 
emergency medical care and services 
• minimize damage to and protect property 
• restore and stabilize critical infrastructure and key resources 
• support reentry, repopulation, long-term recovery, and future hazard 
mitigation 
Response planning assumes that an earthquake of this scale would quickly exceed 
state and local resources. It is anticipated that a significant amount of external resources 
will be required for a disaster response. Oregon will immediately request support from 
FEMA, and in the absence of communications, immediate lifesaving support will be sent 
to forward staging areas on the Oregon coast.301 
300 Oregon Office of Emergency Management, State of Oregon Cascadia Subduction Zone 
Catastrophic Earthquake and Tsunami Operations Plan. 
301 Ibid. 
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V. FINDINGS  
A. ANSWERING THE QUESTION: HOW CAN THE GEOPOLITICAL, 
PHYSICAL, ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS 
IDENTIFIED IN THE CASE STUDIES IMPACT THE 
RECONSTRUCTION OF SEASIDE, OREGON? 
1. L’ AQUILA, ITALY 
a. Economic Impacts and Financial Support for Recovery—Findings 
The economic impact to Oregon is estimated to be in excess of $32 billion 
dollars.302 Planning assumptions of the federal and Oregon CSZ response plans are that 
at the time of the modeled earthquake, no other major disasters are occurring in the 
United States and that response will be immediate and heavy to support Oregon, 
Washington, and California.303 A large-scale federal response would be similar to the 
L’Aquila experience, as local and state government responses would be impacted 
severely. It is likely that, similar to L’Aquila, ample financial support will be available to 
conduct response and recovery operations. 
Long-term recovery in Oregon may also stagnate due to reduced tax revenue, 
evacuation of the population workers to areas with safety, and better job outlooks.304 
Outmigration of workers and families will likely impact severely the recovery of 
businesses and reduce the tax base of local government when it is most needed. The fact 
that Clatsop County (in which Seaside is located) already has a higher percentage of 
persons living below the poverty line than the national average305 creates additional 
302 Cascade Region Earthquake Workgroup (CREW), Cascadia Subduction Zone Earthquakes: A 
Magnitude 9.0 Earthquake Scenario (Cascadia Region Geology and Emergency Management Agencies: 
Cascade Region Earthquake Workgroup (CREW), 2013). 
303 Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Region X, Cascadia Subduction Zone (CSZ) 
Catastrophic Earthquake and Tsunami Response Plan, 8–9. 
304 Alexander, “Models of Social Vulnerability to Disasters.”  
305 U.S. Census Bureau, “State and County Quickfacts—Clatsop County, Oregon,” January 6, 2014, 
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/41/41007.html. 
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concerns for recovery due to research that the poor are far less likely to recover from a 
catastrophic disaster and are more likely to relocate.306  
Despite the tremendous economic damages of the earthquake, large federal 
response and recovery assistance is both planned for and expected. The challenge will be 
in the ability of Seaside to utilize this injection of assistance to accommodate and employ 
surviving citizens in economic activities that will reap benefits beyond the reconstruction 
phase. It is critical that local and state governments work with existing businesses and 
employers to develop business continuity protocols and contingency plans to ensure that 
business and industry vital to the recovery and beyond are able to continue. Pre-
earthquake economic development is crucial along the Oregon coast to combat the 
identified issues of poverty and relocation of citizens.  
b. Natural Barriers to Recovery—Findings 
Due to the population density and infrastructure of Central Italy, it is hard to 
compare this event with coastal Oregon. One similarity that would likely appear was 
noted in the description of the mountainous geography of Central Italy that gave a sense 
of distance, and with it, the psychological issues of separation that would not have been 
as apparent in flatter terrain. Evacuee adults who have lost their homes were especially 
vulnerable to a sense of abandonment and disorientation due to the loss of community.307 
Coastal Oregon is much more rural and isolated. Access to the coast from the Willamette 
Valley is only through seven two-lane highways that cross the Coast Mountain range. All 
these highways are expected to have major damage, which would limit access to and 
from the coast.308 It is plausible that Oregon evacuees will have similar if not worse 
isolation and fears of abandonment as Italians had.  
306 Rozario, “Rising from the Ruins”; Glasmeier, interview by Peter Dizikes, “3 Questions: Amy 
Glasmeier on Rebuilding After Disaster Hits.” 
307 Alexander, “An Evaluation of Medium-Term Recovery Processes After the 6 April 2009 
Earthquake in L’Aquila, Central Italy,” 60–73. 
308 Oregon Department of Transportation Bridge Engineering Section, Seismic Vulnerability of 
Oregon State Highway Bridges. 
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The size and wildness of the Oregon coastline coupled with the severity of the 
modeled CSZ earthquake, roadway loss, and isolation can be expected. Continuation of 
coastal roadway improvements and bridge seismic retrofitting projects currently being 
done by the State of Oregon are needed, along with roadway “lifeline” planning that 
identifies vulnerabilities and likely needs of Oregon roadways. Work in reception 
communities for coastal evacuees to ensure social networks are maintained and evacuated 
citizens are kept informed of the status of the response and recovery in their communities 
is also needed. A positive lesson to be learned from L’Aquila is that the distance from 
abandoned homes had less of an impact on children due to the artificial social structure of 
schools and routine established in the evacuation areas. Ensuring that all evacuated 
persons have a structure and routine to focus on will be helpful. 
c. Land Use and Mitigation Planning Recovery Issues—Findings 
The construction of large-scale housing complexes akin to the CASE project in 
L’Aquila is unlikely due to the topography and population size of the Oregon coast. 
Issues arising in the CASE projects should be addressed to avoid similar issues.  
The CASE project was built in environmentally sensitive areas with sanitation 
unable to handle the population size. The American practice of using temporary shelters, 
such as trailers and “Katrina Cottage” type small pre-fabricated housing units (Figure 




Figure 15.  “Katrina Cottage” Temporary Housing in the Lower 9th Ward of 
New Orleans309 
 
Figure 16.  CASE Housing Unit at Bazzano, Outside of L’Aquila310 
 
309 Wikipedia, s.v. “Katrina Cottage,” last modified April 3, 2013, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ 
Katrina_Cottage. 
310 Alexander, “Models of Social Vulnerability to Disasters.” 
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The CASE projects also failed to provide standard amenities to evacuees, such as 
government assistance offices, commercial activities, and medical offices. The projects 
were built far from the evacuated city with limited means to travel to locations for these 
services. In the wake of a CSZ earthquake and tsunami, the ability to reach areas not 
impacted by the event would be even greater. Most cities on the coast would face similar 
hardships as Seaside, and the ability to reach larger cities identified as critical areas of 
support (Astoria is the nearest to Seaside, 16.4 miles away) would be severely impacted 
due to roadway damage. Critical coastal roadways will be severed for months until 
repaired.  
Italy’s regional risk reduction and natural hazard mitigation policies were 
inadequate for L’Aquila and many other communities throughout the country. Below the 
regional governments, only a small number of Italian municipalities have comprehensive 
disaster reduction (mitigation) plans.311  
A recent mitigation initiative in Seaside, a local bond measure looking to 
construct a new school above the tsunami inundation zone and built to more stringent 
building codes to also serve as a long-term community shelter, was defeated severely 
(62% to 38%) in the 2013 election.312  
Recovery planning on the catastrophic scale has not occurred at the local state or 
federal level. In a 2013 audit of the Oregon Office of Emergency Management, the 
Oregon Secretary of State’s office found that the state does not have a formal Relief and 
Recovery Plan; without a complete plan, the state’s recovery from a major disaster could 
be delayed and less effective.313 Due to the catastrophic events of a CSZ earthquake, the 
effectiveness of local government in Seaside (and in Clatsop County) is likely to be 
severely diminished. With the State of Oregon’s recovery efforts to date lacking, and 
311 Alexander, “An Evaluation of Medium-Term Recovery Processes After the 6 April 2009 
Earthquake in L’Aquila, Central Italy,” 60–73. 
312 Louie Opatz, “Precinct By Precinct, Bond Measure Took Beating,” The Daily Astorian, November 
23, 2013, http://m.dailyastorian.com/mobile/your_town/cannon_beach/precinct-by-precinct-bond-measure-
took-beating/article_651fa53e-542c-11e3-9e3e-0019bb2963f4.html. 
313 Oregon Secretary of State, “Office of Emergency Management: Rebuilding the Organization to 
Strengthen Oregon’s Emergency Management,” February 2014, http://sos.oregon.gov/audits/. 
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local governments having the inability to function due to the event, it would fall on the 
federal government and outside assistance to lead much of the recovery efforts. Based off 
the L’Aquila experience, this scenario is an issue for coastal Oregon and the City of 
Seaside that needs to be addressed with effective recovery planning and pre-defined 
visions on what the future of the city is to look like.  
Recovery planning for temporary housing locations on the coast (and elsewhere in 
the state as transportation damages are expected throughout the I-5 corridor) needs to 
address amenities and survivor needs in nearby locations, and should occur as recovery 
plans at the local, state, and federal level are developed for this scenario. 
Due to the terrain of the Oregon coast, construction would likely be forced to 
occur on environmentally sensitive and zoning restricted properties (farm and forest 
zoned property, hillsides, etc.). At the present, no uniform land use planning protocols 
exist for establishing temporary housing or survivor encampments. Haphazard, unsafe, 
and unsanitary development may occur without these provisions in local and state land 
use planning requirements. Like Italy, conflict could occur in the absence of a 
comprehensive recovery plan.314 
Financial support for community investments in education and safety will need to 
occur to enable these protective measures to be made. As evidenced by the bond measure 
defeat, financial assistance for public building improvements and shelters in safe areas 
will need to come from outside sources, or the local population will need to recognize the 
need to pay for these upgrades. 
Oregon has natural hazard disaster mitigation planning in all 36 counties and has 
worked to secure funding for federal and state pre-disaster mitigation projects. This effort 
will need to continue, or be enhanced. It would be politically difficult, but prioritization 
for coastal projects may be required. Every effort should be expended to ensure that 
funding for natural hazard mitigation planning and mitigation continue to lessen the 
impact of this future event. 
314 Alexander, “An Evaluation of Medium-Term Recovery Processes After the 6 April 2009 
Earthquake in L’Aquila, Central Italy,” 60–73. 
 82 
                                                 
Pre-event recovery planning also needs to involve local residents and a 
mechanism created to involve surviving local residents formally in the recovery process 
after the earthquake. 
d. The Social and Psychological Stresses of the Loss of Community—
Findings 
As described in other sections of this research, the involvement of the L’Aquila 
local populace in recovery and restoration of their community was very limited, and had 
a negative impact on the community’s social structure and well-being of survivors.  
High levels of psychological distress were found in 65.6% of the residents 
studied.315 In the transitional shelter that followed the hotel and tent phase, domestic 
violence, substance abuse, and other social pathologies increased significantly.316 In the 
transitional housing developments, other social and psychological consequences resulted 
from the lack of attention to social structure and networks. Residents had an enhanced 
sense of “isolation, abandonment and powerlessness.”317 
An analysis on what social structure is important to Seaside’s citizens and 
determinations on how to incorporate those needs into pre-event recovery planning both 
in the community and in likely reception communities at which evacuees would be 
housed. 
e. The Geopolitical and Sociological Need of the Case Study Community to 
Rebuild—Findings 
The research of the L’Aquila experience overwhelmingly points the finger at a 
lack of inclusion of local requirements, wishes, and citizens as a cause for the recovery 
challenges and issues since 2009. Corruption investigations of non-local contractors and 
government officials from outside the area added fuel to the sense L’Aquila’s citizens 
315 Casacchia, Pollice, and Roncone, “The Narrative Epidemiology of L’Aquila 2009 Earthquake,” 
13–21. 
316 Camillan Task Force, “Studio Rainbow: Storia Naturale dei Disturbi da Stress Postraumatico 
(PTSD) Nei Bambini Abruzzesi Esposti al Terremoto Dell’aprile 2009.”  
317 Alexander, “An Evaluation of Medium-Term Recovery Processes After the 6 April 2009 
Earthquake in L’Aquila, Central Italy,” 60–73. 
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feeling that outside groups were ignoring them. Open conflict between the two groups 
erupted on the streets of L’Aquila and Rome as a result. 
When reading the assumptions from the FEMA Region X CSZ Earthquake and 
Tsunami Response Plan, it appears that “local, state and federal responders will be 
overwhelmed by the magnitude of the incident” and “regional response resources will be 
inadequate because of the catastrophic nature of the event and a limited capability to 
function.”318 State response assumptions echoes this seriousness. “The earthquake and 
resultant tsunami is so severe that the response capabilities and resources of the local 
jurisdictions and the state are immediately rendered insufficient, overwhelmed, and 
exhausted.”319 These assumptions and the planning courses of action written as a result, 
show that this catastrophic event will require an extremely large (and needed) federal 
response. The recovery of Oregon will likely be heavily dependent on outside assistance 
as well.  
The United States does not have the stereotypical corruption levels of Italy; it can 
be argued that it is worse. As stated in the Transparency International Corruption by 
Country Index, “Corruption among government and political figures remains a concern. 
From fraud and embezzlement charges to the failure to uphold ethical standards, there are 
multiple cases of corruption at the federal, state and local level. Money laundering 
convictions and ethics violations by U.S. Congress representatives has also furthered 
citizen distrust.”320 The United States is ranked 19 (with a score of zero being very 
corrupt and 100 being very clean) in the list of government corruption, with Italy having a 
ranking of 69. The data in Italy’s ranking likely reflected a bill introduced after the 
Berlusconi administration left power by previous Italian Prime Minister Mario Monte 
calling for greater accountability and transparency in Italian politics and government by 
318 Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Region X, Cascadia Subduction Zone (CSZ) 
Catastrophic Earthquake and Tsunami Response Plan, 8–9. 
319 Oregon Office of Emergency Management, State of Oregon Cascadia Subduction Zone 
Catastrophic Earthquake and Tsunami Operations Plan. 
320 Transparency International, “Corruption by Country,” January 26, 2014, http://www.transparency. 
org/country#USA_Chapter. 
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establishing, among others, an anti-corruption agency and introducing whistleblower 
protection in the public sector.321 
It would serve Seaside and other Oregon communities to plan proactively for 
recovery, and local governments and surviving citizens’ roles in it. This planning will 
likely prove extremely valuable and convey pre-event to locals and outsiders that the 
recovery of Seaside will be pre-designed and pre-planned based on Seaside’s priorities. 
More importantly, based on the stresses and challenges suffered by L’Aquila, Seaside 
will be recovered by its citizens, even in the aftermath. 
While Oregon-specific data on corruption was not located for this study, and 
therefore an unknown issue, it would still be beneficial to establish, along with long-term 
recovery planning, an established contracting system pre-event. A transparent view of 
pre-identified contractors could be useful in exposing post-event corruption. Social media 
is monitored and used heavily in the response phase of natural disasters; in L’Aquila, it 
galvanized opposition to recovery problems in the city. By utilizing social media to 
monitor recovery and provide information to citizens in real-time, it would allow the 
recovery to be more transparent and open to citizen inputs. FEMA has begun to promote 
the use of social media through trainings, such as instructor led courses like PER-304—
Social Media for Natural Disaster Response and Recovery. 
2. WATSONVILLE, CALIFORNIA 
a. Economic Impacts and Financial Support for Recovery—Findings 
The Watsonville experience showed the vulnerabilities of and the need to support 
low-income and vulnerable populations. It was determined that pre-event outreach to 
rental tenants, low-income residents, non-English speaking residents, and tourists would 
pay dividends in the chaos after the earthquake. Identifying and educating residents of 
potential post-event economic assistance and requirements to receive it would be useful 
in low-income populations.  
321 Transparency International, “Corruption by Country,” January 26, 2014, http://www.transparency. 
org/country#USA_Chapter. 
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While Seaside does not currently have the large Spanish-speaking immigrant 
population that Watsonville has, their population continues to grow in Seaside. Seaside 
had a higher percentage of low-income residents in 2010 (17.7%)322 than Watsonville 
had prior to the Loma Prieta earthquake in 1989 (15.3%).323 The heavy tourist transient 
population may skew these numbers on any given day. Establishing multi-lingual 
outreach regarding disaster preparedness but also information on post-disaster economic 
assistance protocols could make the transition to recovery easier for these populations. 
A lesson from Watsonville was in the flexibility of housing programs to 
accommodate the population. By relaxing the standards to prove residency, it was 
possible to move survivors from temporary shelter to transitional housing. The small-
scale grant program instituted by Watsonville was also effective in getting needed 
financing to people rapidly. Seaside and the State of Oregon should, as a part of recovery 
planning efforts, look at the pre-establishment of these sorts of programs that can smooth 
recovery and speed reconstruction.  
The passage of a post-disaster tax measure focused on recovery helped 
Watsonville generate a large amount of money that could be utilized on local recovery 
actions not tied to federal of state restrictions. Based on the large-scale destruction and 
disruption after a CSZ earthquake and tsunami, it is uncertain whether a post-disaster tax 
for recovery would have much impact. A 2013 measure to construct a new K-12 school 
located outside of the tsunami inundation area was significantly defeated.324 Future pre-
event tax measures for earthquake resilience and recovery could also face a difficult path 
to implementation. 
b. Natural Barriers to Recovery—Findings 
Watsonville does not have the natural barriers that could limit recovery that the 
Oregon Coast has. Similar to Oregon’s statewide land use planning system, planning in 
322 U.S. Census Bureau, “State and County Quickfacts-Seaside (City) Oregon.”  
323 U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, “SOCDS Census Data: Output for 
Watsonville City, CA,” April 18, 2014. http://socds.huduser.org/Census/incpov.odb?msacitylist=7485.0* 
0600083668*1.0&metro=msa. 
324 Opatz, “Precinct By Precinct, Bond Measure Took Beating.”  
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1989 Watsonville was geared to contain urban growth and preserve farmland. As 
described by O’Toole, these smart growth policies created to reduce the spread of low 
density urban development creates an artificial land and housing shortage.325 
Watsonville’s housing shortage became apparent as it struggled to place temporary 
housing within its city. The simplification of the land use planning process, and allowing 
non-conforming land uses and increased housing densities was needed to meet housing 
needs. With the majority of Seaside’s urban growth boundary (UGB) expected to be 
inundated by a CSZ tsunami, local, county, and state land use planning will need to 
develop policies and criteria to identify locations currently zoned for farm or forest uses 
outside of the UGB that could be used for temporary urban recovery locations (shelters, 
mass care sites, temporary housing, etc.). Ideally, and where possible, this post-disaster 
land use recovery planning would coincide with an active effort by local, county, and 
state land use and emergency management planners to move housing and critical urban 
services to more resilient areas outside of the inundation area. The City of Seaside 
Planning Department was not willing to provide a copy of the current zoning and 
comprehensive plan maps for this research due to their current revision. Analysis of 
current planning designations and zoning restrictions would be beneficial to determine 
ideal post-disaster areas best suited to guide future housing and infrastructure to more 
resilient areas. 
c. Land Use and Mitigation Planning Recovery Issues—Findings 
In addition to adapting post-disaster planning to smart growth practices in an ad-
hoc manner, Watsonville was reasonably successful in simplifying recovery-planning 
efforts on pushing repair and reconstruction permits through the system. Focusing efforts 
on building inspections, the end state of the building process, sped reconstruction efforts. 
A lesson learned from Watsonville and Santa Cruz County after the 1989 earthquake was 
that development of post-disaster permitting procedures is crucial. Local governments 
may lack the ability to conduct planning and building permitting “normally” after a 
disaster event; for Seaside, the catastrophic CSZ scenario will undoubtedly eliminate any 
325 Randal O’Toole, “Population Growth and Cities,” The Electronic Journal of Sustainable 
Development 1, no. 3 (2009): 97–104. 
 87 
                                                 
semblance of “normal” for the city. As described earlier, pre-event decisions with citizen 
involvement based off modeled impacts on how non-conforming uses and re-zoning of 
properties in the aftermath needs to occur to limit conflicts and obtain community buy-in. 
As described in the L’Aquila case study, and in other locations of this research, it is 
crucial to involve the citizenry in the design phase. 
d. The Social and Psychological Stresses of the Loss of Community—
Findings 
The small-town work ethic of Watsonville was evident in a quote noted by Eadie 
that “the fact that people knew each other by their first names made it easier for people to 
be concerned with more than their own interests.”326 As described in the Valdez, Alaska, 
case study, this work ethic appears to be a trend in smaller heterogeneous (as relating to 
the Spanish-speaking immigrant population in Watsonville) communities. This 
observation, if indeed true, bodes well for the smaller, rural areas of the Oregon coast, 
including the City of Seaside. The Oregon coast, and particularly communities in Lincoln 
and Clatsop Counties, have stepped up citizen preparedness and involvement in 
preparations for a CSZ earthquake. Volunteerism is high amongst Oregonians (34.1% in 
2012).327 The Oregon coast is aware of the risk, and is producing and expanding planning 
to deal with the event, and possesses an active citizenry focused on preparedness.328 
These volunteer efforts, along with a sense of community, will conceivably have benefits 
similar to those experienced as Watsonville rallied to recover.  
Another lesson of the Watsonville experience is that local government needs to be 
prepared to face new political realities post-disaster and embrace the efforts of local 
committees. As seen in L’Aquila, and described in the research done by Bartlett, 
Quarantelli, and Dynes, and Kunreuther and Fiore, showed connections between local 
involvement and social and psychological recovery following disaster. As recovery 
326 Eadie, “Earthquake Case Study: Loma Prieta in Santa Cruz and Watsonville, California,” 281–310. 
327 Corporation for National and Community Service, “Volunteering and Civic Engagement in 
Oregon,” accessed April 21, 2014, http://www.volunteeringinamerica.gov/OR. 
328 Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Citizen Corps.”  
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planning for the post-disaster realities of Seaside begins, it needs to involve the 
community and ensure that involvement continues. 
As Watsonville discovered, Seaside should take heed of the need to respect the 
sheltering decisions of the population. Watsonville’s impromptu tent cities originally 
were going to be closed by the county, which was afraid of unhealthy conditions. After 
discovering the sociological (keeping social networks intact) and psychological benefits 
(fear of past experiences in the Mexico City earthquake) the camps offered, they worked 
with the community on mutually agreeable solutions for temporary sheltering. With the 
large-scale devastation and isolation of Oregon coastal communities, many types of 
shelters will likely be established. It is imperative that the population’s health and safety 
be maintained while respecting community needs during a very difficult time. 
Community and neighborhood groups in Seaside and elsewhere should work with 
emergency planners to discuss these needs in development of response and recovery 
plans. Including diverse groups in sheltering and disaster housing would help solve post-
disaster issues described by Haas and others as “overlooking people and their problems is 
tantamount to increasing the effects of disaster”329 
e. The Geopolitical and Sociological Need of the Case Study Community to 
Rebuild—Findings 
Studies have shown that perceived differences in the quality of response and 
recovery actions based on ethnic lines led to feelings of distrust and injustice. Language 
and cultural differences added to challenges faced by responders and the community. The 
impact of poverty added to the challenge of rebuilding the city. The University of 
Colorado at Boulder Natural Hazards Center has indicated that the plight of these 
communities needs to be lessened through consistency, sincerity, and following through 
on promises.330 Ensuring transparency and disadvantaged populations informed of 
recovery actions and methods of getting help is critical. Prior to the earthquake, the City 
of Seaside, Clatsop County and the State of Oregon should establish networks within 
329 Haas, Kates, and Bowden, Reconstruction Following Disaster. 
330 Natural Hazards Center, Holistic Disaster Recovery Ideas for Building Local Sustainability after a 
Natural Disaster. 
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disadvantaged populations to develop trust and awareness. Following up on already 
produced bilingual disaster outreach materials with hands on community meetings and 
social networking in the communities will lessen tensions based on the Watsonville 
experience.  
Prior to the earthquake, Watsonville was already experiencing political challenges 
that were only exacerbated following the event when elections were delayed. Seaside and 
other communities as a part of Continuation of Operations/Continuity of Government 
(COOP/COG) planning should plan for solutions and protocols to maintain civic 
elections and community based advisory groups. Citizen committees in Watsonville 
served as a conduit for communication on housing and commercial reconstruction needs. 
Seaside should continue to facilitate the involvement of neighborhood groups and should 
also take a continued active advisory role in response and recovery planning as it has in 
helping neighborhoods and citizens develop tsunami supply caches and other outreach 
programs.331 This outreach should dovetail with increased efforts previously discussed to 
assist low income, non-English speaking, tourist populations, and the immigrant 
population in promoting not only pre-event preparation information, but incorporating 
post-event assistance and recovery information, such as bilingual or clearly identifiable 
and understood emergency signage, building assessments, and assistance information. 
Wide-scale infrastructure damage on the Oregon coast will create isolated pockets 
of survivors in Clatsop County. As Watsonville recognized the impromptu shelters 
created to preserve social bonds, Seaside and other communities should plan and prepare 
for dealing with a population unable or unwilling to move to official sheltering locations, 
as well as include an analysis of likely isolated pockets of population and their immediate 
lifesaving needs and difficulties in initiating early recovery. 
Lastly, the Justice Department ruling calling for increased community groups in 
the recovery planning process has provided, statewide in California, a method for dealing 
with the post-disaster and recovery needs of vulnerable minority and low-income 
populations. As Oregon state and local CSZ planning moves into considering recovery 
331 City of Seaside, “Earthquake and Tsunami Preparedness,” accessed April 21, 2014, http://www. 
cityofseaside.us/emergency-preparedness/earthquake-and-tsunami-preparedness. 
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issues, it would be beneficial for Seaside and the rest of the state to take heed of the 
negative experience of L’Aquila Italy previously described, and that of Watsonville, 
which has relatively positive post-earthquake experiences with community involvement 
in recovery. 
3. VALDEZ, ALASKA 
a. Economic Impacts and Financial Support for Recovery—Findings 
The 1964 Alaskan earthquake and tsunami is a very similar event physically, 
geographically, and comparatively with regard to Oregon coastal communities and a CSZ 
event. As described, Valdez was damaged to the point that relocation was the only 
acceptable solution to recovery in the community. Economic losses were extremely large 
following the Alaskan earthquake, if the established models are correct, a CSZ 
earthquake and tsunami is estimated to cause $32 billion in Oregon alone,332 with region-
wide damages exceeding $70 billion.333 
The economic support for response and recovery for Alaska was large, in 
particular for cities outside of the Anchorage metropolitan area, such as Valdez, which is 
likely primarily for the geopolitical and isolation issues discussed. With the extent of the 
disaster, it is likely that without large federal aid, recovery in Alaska would have 
languished or failed altogether. With the natural resources of Alaska and the state’s 
geostrategic importance, allowing Alaska to fail was not an option for the United States.  
Seaside may face a similar fate to Old Valdez. Much of the city is likely to be 
destroyed. Recovery and reconstruction will likely require changes to the city’s 
boundaries for safety and hazard mitigation reasons. After a CSZ earthquake, it is likely 
that the majority of aid and assistance will flow to Portland and larger cities in the 
Willamette Valley. The Alaskan experience, to include the reconstruction of Valdez, 
332 Oregon Seismic Safety Policy Advisory Commission, The Oregon Resilience Plan—Cascadia: 
Oregon’s Greatest Natural Threat, 1. 
333 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Homeland Infrastructure Threat and Risk Analysis Center, 
Draft Analytical Baseline Study for the Cascadia Earthquake and Tsunami. 
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showed that effective responses of rural and isolated areas depended on the large influx 
of federal disaster assistance and monies for reconstruction.  
The SBA decision in Alaska to permit loans for homeowners and businesses 
looking to modernize instead of only replacing damaged was fundamental in the recovery 
and modernization of rural Alaskan communities, and was extremely beneficial in 
moving Valdez to its new location. Valdez was able to capitalize on the damages by 
modernizing a town described as “shabby”334 with modern structures and infrastructure 
capable of supporting the community’s future growth. In Seaside, a vacation destination 
with a large number of vacation and rental homes, a key change to the current SBA 
policies that could benefit community recovery is allowing for loans to rebuild second 
homes. The current policies of not allowing loans for second homes have impacted the 
recovery of beach towns recovering from Hurricane Sandy.335 The financial burdens of 
rebuilding a second home could conceivably have an impact on recovery in cities 
throughout earthquake-damaged Oregon, as homeowners struggle to cover losses in their 
primary and secondary homes.  
Additionally, the use of SBA loans to retire debt enabled Alaskans to emerge 
from the disaster with less debt burden than they would have, which reduced 
bankruptcies and foreclosures in the years following the earthquake. Having a clear 
vision of requirements and possibilities with disaster loans would enable homeowners 
and businesses to better envision their financial parameters if their homes and/or 
businesses were lost. This recommendation goes along with the recommendation for pre-
planning in the realities of the post-earthquake Oregon Coast. Along with this pre-
planning, it would behoove planners to envision the long-term economic trajectory the 
city would have after the earthquake. Much like Valdez was able to diversify its economy 
by increasing tourism opportunities, incorporating post-disaster commercial and 
industrial projections to comprehensive planning would enable the city to act on 
opportunities more effectively.  
334 National Research Council, The Great Alaska Earthquake of 1964, Human Ecology. 
335 Eugene Palk, “Left Out of Federal Sandy Relief, Owners of Second Homes Hope for Help,” 
NJ.com, May 19, 2013, http://www.nj.com/ocean/index.ssf/2013/05/left_out_of_federal_sandy_relief_ 
owners_of_second_homes_hope_for_help.html. 
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b. Natural Barriers to Recovery—Findings 
The physical impacts of the 1964 Good Friday Alaskan earthquake and tsunami, 
along with the isolation of the area, make this case study the most analogous to a CSZ 
event along the Oregon coast. Modeled and anticipated infrastructure damage of a CSZ 
earthquake would make Seaside and the rest of the Oregon coast extremely hard to reach, 
which would prolong response and delay recovery. Unlike coastal Oregon (based on CSZ 
modeling), Valdez was able to obtain support (and facilitate post-disaster migration) via 
the Richardson Highway. Adding to the difficulty is the fact that the Alaskan population 
is only 1/5 that of Oregon,336 which does add to the complexity of supporting response 
and recovery. 
Alaska’s process of expediting building permits allowed for reconstruction to 
occur rapidly. Oregon does not have the same sort of extremes in seasonal construction, 
but the seasonally wet winters on the Oregon coast do require construction to proceed at 
an expedited rate. By establishing city, county, and state disaster building permit 
protocols before the earthquake, coupled with disaster land use planning and disaster 
mitigation standards previously discussed in the Watsonville, California, lessons learned, 
Seaside could theoretically be prepared to issue permits quickly following a catastrophic 
disaster. 
c. Land Use and Mitigation Planning Recovery Issues—Findings 
Like other case studies in this research, the necessity of streamlining land use 
permitting and issuing of building permits was shown to be effective in the relocation of 
the City of Valdez. It enabled construction to occur within the shortened building season 
and with increased mitigation construction measures. Seaside would be well served to 
have procedures established pre-event on the issuance of (re)building permits and the 
land use and zoning requirements needed for construction to occur. The designs of these 
procedures and land use criteria will need to include and not sacrifice the likely 
mitigation and modern seismic safety standards required of new construction. In Valdez’s 
336 U.S. Census Bureau, “Statistical Abstract of the United States, 2012,” October 11, 2011, 
https://www.census.gov/prod/www/statistical_abstract.html#. 
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case, it can allow a city to react positively to new planning guidance and infrastructure 
allowing for reconstruction to be safer and better designed to meet civic challenges.  
As development planning for the new town site occurred, Valdez kept its 
residents aware and involved through the use of citizen committees and open meetings. It 
appears that this citizen involvement aided in the rapid relocation of the city (three years). 
Following the lessons of Valdez, it is likely that inclusive post-disaster planning and 
design of the City of Seaside will require the involvement of the whole community to be 
successful.  
Valdez is experiencing a rebirth of interest in establishing new uses for the Old 
Valdez town site as the city grows and memories of the 1964 event are less current. As 
restrictions on building in the old city site expire, interest in development is becoming 
more frequent. Valdez is developing a land use plan for the old city, which limits 
development in the most dangerous locations. Pre-event planning done by the City of 
Seaside should consider the future uses of areas of the city that may be abandoned as the 
city recovers. Revision of plans and ordinances (Periodic Review) for a city the size of 
Seaside is required every 5–15 years according to the State Department of Land Use 
Conservation and Development and required by Senate Bill 543, passed in 1999.337 
Periodic review and the involvement of the community in charting the parameters of 
reconstruction in Seaside post-event are vital for both the city and its citizens. 
d. The Social and Psychological Stresses of the Loss of Community—
Findings 
“Alaskans will want to be helpful. Volunteers and those offering services for pay 
will come forward. They will need resourceful leadership…Alaskans will not riot, take 
unlawful advantage of those victimized, or tolerate those who attempt such behavior.”338 
These statements from the current Alaskan emergency operations plan were true in 1964 
Valdez at the time of the earthquake. While it is likely and hopeful to assume that the 
337 Ken S. Calbick, “The Use of Program Theory for Identifying and Evaluating “Best Practices” for 
Implementing Land-Use Policies” (master’s thesis, Simon Frasier University, 2003). 
338 State of Alaska, Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Management, State of Alaska 
Emergency Operations Plan, 7. 
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altruism of 1964 Alaska will play out on the Oregon coast, pre-identified post-disaster 
planning for recovery and socio-economic resilience will be crucial to assuring that social 
order and a spirit to rebuild flourishes after the disaster.  
The researched economic coordination of Alaskan businesses to support a needy 
population following the earthquake is a testament to this altruism. Mechanisms in place 
to coordinate costs of essential services for both residents and businesses would be 
helpful for both groups to plan effectively for the post-earthquake financial and resource 
shortage realities. Granted, it is difficult to gauge future economic costs and supplies; 
however, enabling a dialogue between the city, community groups and businesses could 
support long-term recovery by implementing a mechanism to allow for a distribution of 
needed scarce resources while allowing businesses to return with some assurances of 
survivability. 
A potential issue for Seaside as response transitions to recovery is the long-term 
evacuation of its citizens. Past events, such as Hurricane Katrina and L’Aquila Italy, have 
shown that extended time in evacuation areas led to a sense of abandonment in evacuees 
leading to a lagging recovery of those cities. The large federal investment in recovery 
following the 1964 earthquake allowed Valdez to avoid this fate, presumably by showing 
residents that their plight was being addressed with vigor. Efforts by state and local 
governments to speed post-disaster planning and permitting recognized the need to 
recover quickly and return to normal. While unintentional, it is conceivable that these 
actions provided hope to residents who stayed to rebuild and evacuees.  
Lastly, despite recent outreach and planning regarding the severity of a CSZ 
earthquake and tsunami, and the challenges coastal residents likely will face in the 
aftermath, research is available that describes a malaise that comes from a lack of disaster 
experience. With Oregon having typically fewer presidentially declared disasters than 
many parts of the nation (see Figures 17 and 18), Oregonian and Seaside residents have 
not experienced recent disasters. In describing “disaster subcultures,” Tierney explains 
that recent disaster experience leads to the exchange of knowledge and preparations 
based on community experiences. Perception of danger is greater and reaction to disasters 
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is swifter and better prepared for in communities that have experienced disaster in recent 
memory.339 
 
Figure 17.  Presidential Disaster Declarations 1964–2007340  
339 Kathleen J. Tierney, “The Social and Community Contexts of Disaster,” in Psychosocial Aspects 
of Disaster, ed. R. M. Gist and B. Lubin (New York, NY: John Wiley and Sons, 1989), 11–39. 
340 Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Presidential Disaster Declarations, December 24, 
1964–March 3, 2007,” 2013, http://www.fema.gov/pdf/hazard/map/declarationsmap1964_07.pdf. 
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Figure 18.  Disaster Risk of United States Metropolitan Locations341 
With the last CSZ earthquake and tsunami occurring in 1700, before European 
settlement, no useful first-hand historical legacy is available to be passed along by a 
“disaster subculture.” Outside of smaller disasters occurring more frequently, continued 
earthquake and tsunami outreach, preparedness events, education of residents, and other 
awareness activities, are really the only solution for Seaside to prepare for and educate its 
residents. Determining how to avoid the loss of awareness, described in the proposed 
developments in the Old Valdez town site, will be critical for future residents of Seaside 
and the Northwest as time passes after the next CSZ earthquake and tsunami. 
e. The Geopolitical and Sociological Need of the Case Study Community to 
Rebuild—Findings 
For a community to be economically sustainable and geopolitically important to 
the nation as a whole, it helps to have critical industry, strategic value, or a role in the 
341 New York Times, “Where to Live to Avoid a Natural Disaster.”  
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expansion of the American economy. The Oregon coast, including the City of Seaside, 
does not have the same geopolitical or economic significance as Alaska, especially as it 
did in 1964, in the midst of the Cold War. This perceived lack of economic and 
geopolitical value for the United States of the Oregon coast could have an impact on 
American taxpayers footing the bill for recovery and on Oregon communities 
economically struggling to recover. The proposed economic development of liquefied 
natural gas (LNG) export terminals on the Oregon coast, currently proposed for Coos Bay 
and Warrenton (12.5 miles north of Seaside),342 could improve the economic prestige of 
the Oregon coast, and perhaps, increase recovery aid to the area following a CSZ 
earthquake. The assumption of this suggestion is that the LNG terminals would be built 
to seismic standards and resilient to tsunami and earthquake hazards as determined by 
geotechnical assessments by coastal counties.343 
Another important strategic geographic significance of Seaside and the northern 
Oregon coast is the proximity to the Columbia River. In the short term, with the CSZ 
event limiting navigation from the sea, availability of emergency supplies to the larger 
cities of Portland and Astoria will be reduced. In the long term, exports of energy and 
agricultural products from the Dakotas westward will be impacted, which will result in an 
extreme financial impact and force alternate routing to ports outside of the impact zone at 
greater cost. The economic importance of the Columbia River is immense to the nation. 
The river enables $20 billion of commerce, with over 42 million tons being shipped 
annually.344 It serves as the conduit for 40% of U.S. wheat exports.345 Columbia River 
shipping directly employs 40,000 people in addition to many jobs created by related 
industries. Barging on the river is a more cost effective, fuel-efficient, and 
environmentally cleaner way to export goods from eastern Oregon and Washington, and 
342 Oregon Department of Energy, “LNG in Oregon,” accessed April 24, 2014, http://www.oregon. 
gov/energy/pages/lng.aspx. 
343 CH2MHill, Site-Specific Seismic Hazard Evaluation for the Oregon LNG Import Terminal 
Appendix I.1 to Resource Report 13 (Warrenton, OR: LNG Development Company, LLC (d/b/a Oregon 
LNG), 2008). 
344 Pacific Northwest Waterways Association, Columbia Snake River Facts (Portland, OR: Pacific 
Northwest Waterways Association, 2012), http://www.pnwa.net/new/Articles/CSRSFactSheet.pdf. 
345 Ibid. 
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the State of Idaho to the Pacific.346 It should be a national priority to reestablish this 
important economic conduit for the western United States.  
The research revealed that Valdez avoided the problems faced by Italian 
authorities in L’Aquila by allowing residents access to their damaged homes in the 
recovery and short-term recovery time periods. This access will not be feasible in many 
cases, but efforts should be made to ensure that residents, where possible and safely, are 
able to access their damaged properties. Recognizing the sense of place that survivors 
have, and needing the opportunity to heal, has been shown to be a requirement of the case 
studies in this research. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Steps for Successful Recovery 
Successful recovery, the return of the majority of the population, with limited 
social and psychological trauma enabling a city to return to its pre-disaster functioning, 
has been shown to coincide with large investments of economic assistance to rebuild. By 
maintaining mitigation standards and allowing easier processing of permits, communities 
have been shown to recover more quickly and wholly.  
In designing the future for a shattered city, a large segment of the research 
unveiled that allowing community participation in the planning and design of 
communities provided needed momentum and consensus to recovery while allowing 
citizens to recover physically and mentally from the disaster. Successful recovery in the 
studied case study communities studied showed that facilitating reconstruction planning 
and permitting quickly and efficiently in the post-disaster environment was a valuable 
solution. By ensuring that post-disaster reconstruction can occur quickly while not 
sacrificing hazard mitigation and safety requirements enabled Watsonville and Valdez to 
recover quicker and more wholly. Immense secondary gains to the rapid processing of 
reconstruction permitting were gained by trimming red tape in the often adversarial 
346 Pacific Northwest Waterways Association, Columbia Snake River Facts. 
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planning and building permit process, which limited the frustration of survivors already 
struggling in the new post-disaster landscape.  
It has been researched that humans have an established sense of place and social 
connection to their communities, which provides attachment and satisfaction347 to their 
place in the world. To outsiders looking in, this attachment is seen as illogical and costly 
when it is in direct conflict to catastrophic disasters, such as a CSZ earthquake and 
tsunami. The case study communities have shown that the sense of place and local 
citizen’s involvement in its reconstruction is key to the recovery of a community and the 
mental health of its residents. Decisions on the fate of a community, its reconstruction or 
abandonment, are a local, city block by city block, personal issue. It is not a decision that 
can be made at a statewide or national level without having serious impacts on survivors 
of the disaster.  
2. Pre-disaster Land Use Planning Is Vital to Post-disaster Recovery  
The strongest and intertwined trend in the case study communities was the 
importance of land use planning in planning for, responding to, and recovering from a 
disaster. The case studies examined in this research show that land use and urban 
planning have a critical and extremely understated role in homeland security and disaster 
recovery. All three communities’ post-disaster recovery and reconstruction efforts 
occurred in an ad-hoc manner; Watsonville and Valdez were able to handle these efforts 
better than L’Aquila, but all of them had to do it without the benefit of forethought.  
Disaster recovery and homeland security are at the center of urban planning goals 
of communities designed on social cohesion and livable communities. L’Aquila’s 
ultimate failure was that it excluded survivors in the design of recovery, and as a result, 
recovery languished and survivors fought openly with the local and Italian governments. 
By ignoring the importance of populations’ need to reclaim its community, it set the stage 
for corruption, stagnation of recovery, and conflict. Watsonville ultimately fared better, 
but its mistakes were in not understanding the diverse community’s needs. Ultimately, it 
347 Jorgenson and Stedman, “A Comparative Analysis of Predictors of Sense of Place Dimensions: 
Attachment to, Dependence on, and Identification with Lakeshore Properties,” 316–327. 
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was able to adapt and make the right decisions (with the guidance of citizen advisory 
groups) and avoided the problems of L’Aquila. Valdez had pressures, such as short 
construction seasons and a national geopolitical need for a strong Alaska to recover 
quickly. Despite these issues, Valdez still involved its citizens in the design of an entirely 
new city. This involvement allowed the new city to be built addressing citizen needs. 
Based on the case studies and learning from the challenges they faced post-
disaster, the conclusion of this research is that land use planning, producing zoning and 
comprehensive planning of economic, residential and industrial locations in a 
community, is critical to disaster response, resilience, and recovery. For areas subject to 
natural disaster, or other homeland security concerns, such as terrorism, land use 
planning should, pre-event, be more intimately interwoven, planning both for 
development and reconstruction following disaster with efforts by emergency 
management organizations dealing with response and recovery planning.  
The State of Oregon has a mechanism in place to engage public safety recovery 
planning through the 19 statewide planning goals (Table 1) developed in 1973 to 
“express the state’s policies on land use and related topics, such as citizen involvement, 

















348 Oregon Department of Land Conservation and Development, “Statewide Planning Goals,” 
Accessed May 12, 2014, http://www.oregon.gov/LCD/pages/goals.aspx. 
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Goal 1  
Citizen 
Involvement 
Goal 2  
Land Use Planning 
Goal 3  
Agricultural Lands 
Goal 4  
Forest Lands 




Areas, and Open 
Spaces 
Goal 6  
Air, Water and 
Land Resources 
Quality 
Goal 7  
Areas Subject to 
Natural Hazards 
Goal 8  
Recreational Needs 
Goal 9  
Economic 
Development 
Goal 10  
Housing 












Goal 16  
Estuarine 
Resources 
Goal 17 Coastal 
Shorelands 
Goal 18  
Beaches and Dunes 
Goal 19  
Ocean Resources 
 
Table 1.   Nineteen Oregon Statewide Planning Goals349  
Currently, the only statewide planning goal out of the 19 to address natural 
disaster is “Goal 7: Areas Subject to Natural Hazard,” which requires local governments 
to adopt comprehensive land use plans to “reduce risk to people and property from 
natural hazards.”350 Goal 7 requires local governments to evaluate the risk of natural 
hazards and limit or mitigate development in those identified areas. Goal 7 is highly 
focused on mitigation, floodplain protection, and the implementation of the National 
Flood Insurance Program (NFIP), necessary in a state with the rainfall that Oregon 
receives, but Goal 7 does not address recovery from catastrophic disaster and it does not 
address planning for future impacts to the city boundaries and location of a devastated 
community. Coordination with emergency management planners and local citizen groups 
could be important measures to address some of the pre-event land use and recovery 
planning that the case study communities were forced to address after the event. The 19 
statewide planning goals have citizen involvement at its core, and the holistic, multi-use 
planning goals designated by the program could allow planning for the future land use 
realities of a tsunami-impacted community, such as Seaside easier to manage. The 
challenge of planning based on theoretical models of future damages will be difficult to 
349 Oregon Department of Land Conservation and Development, “Statewide Planning Goals.” 
350 Oregon Department of Land Conservation and Development, “Statewide Planning Goals,” Goal 7 
Areas Subject to Natural Disasters, accessed May 12, 2014, http://www.oregon.gov/LCD/docs/goals/ 
goal7.pdf. 
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manage, but existing land use mechanisms could be invaluable in these needed efforts. 
The case study communities show that it is perhaps time for a 20th planning goal that 
addresses public safety and preparedness to bridge the gap between sunny day planning 
and that occurring after disaster. 
Oregon, due to its statewide planning mandates, has extremely talented planners 
at the local and state level in land use planning. These planners are working piecemeal on 
different aspects of planning that affect recovery from catastrophic disaster. Additionally, 
as the state prepares for a CSZ earthquake and tsunami, emergency response, recovery 
planning, and mitigation/resilience planners are dealing with multiple issues directly 
related to either existing or future post-event land use issues. The challenge for Seaside 
and the State of Oregon is in maximizing the strength of these existing planning program 
areas and fusing the two discipline’s very different but extremely complimentary 
missions. 
C. ANSWERING THE QUESTION: WHAT IS THE LIKELIHOOD AND 
CONSEQUENCE OF NOT REBUILDING AN AMERICAN CITY AFTER 
CATASTROPHIC DISASTER—THE QUESTION OF ABANDONMENT 
1. Abandonment Could Be the Ultimate Risk Management Strategy 
Abandonment may ultimately be the best risk management. It immediately 
removes a population from a hazardous area and allows them to start anew. However, this 
research identified some problems in simplifying disaster recovery to the question of 
“should we continue to build there.” In authoritarian China, abandonment has been 
effective after a devastating earthquake in Beichuan in removing a population from a 
hazardous area, which limited the costs of hazard mitigation and reconstruction. 
However, this action also has created high rates of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder 
(PTSD), anxiety, and depression in survivors as they struggle to reclaim their lives, 
economic health, and geographical identity.351  
351 P. Kun et al., “Prevalence of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder in Sichuan Province, China After the 
2008 Wenchuan Earthquake,” Public Health 123, no. 11 (November 2009): 703–707. 
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In the United States, the question of intentionally abandoning a city after a 
catastrophic natural disaster, despite being potentially logical and cost-effective, is likely 
a non-starter. The American experience with natural disaster is to respond and recover; 
understandably, this process is affected by time, finance, willingness of the population, 
and geopolitical importance of the location as shown in the investigations of the case 
studies in this research. Despite the conversations of abandoning coastal areas by local 
Coastal Oregon emergency management professionals and federal emergency support 
function (ESF) representatives, the forced permanent abandonment of Seaside or other 
communities are both anathema to the American experience and counterproductive to the 
economic and physical health of survivors.  
2. Not Abandonment, but Diminishment 
Historically, the general pattern of “abandoned cities” after a natural disaster is a 
slow decline unless subjected to an inhospitable for life event, such as the Centralia 
Pennsylvania mine fires, Pripyat near Chernobyl, or Plymouth Montserrat (known as the 
“Pompeii of the Caribbean”) after being buried by volcanic ash.352 Diminishment of 
communities is often an evolutionary process, guided by insightful post-disaster land use 
planning, not a decision. Two examples of this phenomenon follow.  
a. An Example of Diminishment of a City from Antiquity—Antioch 
The ancient city of Antioch, its remnants located in modern day Turkey, as shown 
in Figure 19, is a long-term example of the slow diminishment of a city following 
catastrophic natural disaster. Prior to its slow decline, Antioch was a city on the scale and 
importance of the other great Mediterranean cities of Rome and Alexandria. Antioch was 
described as economically vibrant, full of aristocrats and consumers, and compared to 
19th century Paris.353  
 
352 Montserrat Tourist Board, “History of Plymouth,” accessed May 1, 2014, http://www.visitmont 
serrat.com/History_of_Plymouth. 
353 H. V. Morton, In the Steps of St. Paul (Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press, 2002). 
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A thousand talents of gold were remitted to the city from the tributes by 
the emperor; and, besides, to individual citizens, the imposts of the houses 
destroyed: and that he also took measures for the restoration both of them 
and of the public buildings.354 
 
Figure 19.  Location Map of Antioch (Antakya) Turkey355 
Antioch endured a series of significant devastating earthquakes between 525 and 
580 AD; the most significant was the earthquake of 526 AD, estimated to be between 
VIII (destructive) and IX (violent) on the Mercalli intensity scale.356 These events were 
responded to and prior to 588 AD, the city endured through earthquakes, occupation and 
plague due to financial investment in the rebuilding by Byzantine Emperor Justinian 
necessary due to the vital geopolitical significance of the city at the borders of the 
Western and Eastern worlds.357  
354 Evagrius Scholasticus, The Ecclesiastical History of Evagrius, trans. Edward Walford (London: 
Samuel Bagster and Son, 1846), 60. 
355 Created by author using Bing Maps online map tool. 
356 Mohamed Reda Sbeinati, Ryad Darawcheh, and Mikhail Mouty, “The Historical Earthquakes of 
Syria: An Analysis of Large and Moderate Earthquakes from 1365 B.C. to 1900 A.D,” Annals of 
Geophysics 48, no. 3 (June 2005): 347–435. 
357 Phillip J. Palin, “Disasters and Catastrophe at Antioch,” Homeland Security Watch, accessed May 
1, 2014, http://www.hlswatch.com/2010/05/08/disasters-and-catastrophe-at-antioch/. 
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Another large earthquake hit Antioch in 588 AD and killed approximately 60,000 
people;358 the city was unable to recover from this event and began its gradual decline. In 
a blog post, Palin suggests it occurred as a result of inter-related factors including the 
enduring economic impacts of the earthquake and overspending by the Byzantine 
government leading to a recovering city being less resilient to social upheaval and the 
impacts of drought and plague occurring after the 588 earthquake.359 Despite several 
significant catastrophes in Antioch, no conscious effort was made to abandon the city; it 
happened gradually as the city lost relevance due to the secondary impacts of intertwined 
economic, psychological, social, and geopolitical factors. The city lost relevance as the 
toll from disaster upon disaster added up. Land use planning may also have played a role, 
with historians questioning the movement of the city’s walls to a more mountainous area 
leading to a less defensible city, ruins of which are shown in Figure 20.360 
 
Figure 20.  Ruins of Antioch (Antakya) Turkey361  
358 Geoffrey Greatrex and Samuel N. C. Lieu, The Roman Eastern Frontier and the Persian Wars AD 
363–628 (New York, NY: Routledge, 2008), 170. 
359 Palin, “Disasters and Catastrophe at Antioch.”  
360 Antiochepedia=Musings Upon Ancient Antioch, “Abandoning the Island–The Fatal Mistake,” 
accessed May 6, 2014, http://libaniusredux.blogspot.com/2009/07/abandoning-island-fatal-mistake.html. 
361 Jack Brauer, “Antakya Summit Turkey,” Mountain Photography, May 15, 2014. http://www. 
mountainphotography.com/photo/roman-ruins-antakya/. 
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b. The Diminishment of Galveston, Texas 
On September 8, 1900, the city of Galveston, Texas, in the Gulf of Mexico as 
depicted in Figure 21, was hit by a Category 4 hurricane and large 15-foot storm surge 
that destroyed much of the city and killed 6,000 of its residents, approximately one of 
every six Galvestonians. A firsthand account of the event described, “one of the most 
horrible sights that ever a civilized people looked upon” when telling about half of the 
city’s homes (estimated at 3,000) had been “swept out of existence.”362 The cost of the 
storm was estimated at more than $30 million, equal to approximately $78 billion dollars 
in 2005.363 Figures 22 and 23 depict the immense damage of the storm. 
 
Figure 21.  Location Map of Galveston, Texas364 
362 Isaac M. Cline, Monthly Weather Review - Special Report on the Galveston Hurricane 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Weather Bureau, 1900). 
363 Roger A. Jr. Pielke et al., “Normalized Hurricane Damage in the United States: 1900–2005.” 
Natural Hazards Review (American Society of Civil Engineers) 9, no. 1 (February 2008): 29–42. 
364 Created by author using Bing Maps online map tool. 
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Surviving residents were faced with the shock of their own personal loss and the 
horror of the mass fatalities of their neighbors needing to be disposed of for health 
reasons. The dead were at first disposed of at sea. Later, when some of the bodies began 
washing ashore, funeral pyres were used to cremate the victims. This undertaking was a 
brutal task in the warm climate and when volunteers could not be found, some residents 
were forced at gunpoint to complete this task.365 Adding to the misery, access to 
Galveston Island was limited when the bridge to the mainland was destroyed. This 
isolation reduced response and initial recovery support.366  
Prior to the hurricane, Galveston was one of the United States’ most prestigious 
cities, known as the “New York of the South.” It was one of the wealthiest cities per 
capita in the nation.367 It was a city of incredible economic importance to the United 
States. As Galveston began recovery, sentiments were optimistic that the city would 
recover. Chase quoted I. H. Kempner, City of Galveston Treasurer, as saying, “I contend 
there is not the slightest doubt about the city being rehabilitated with a rapidity that will 
prove almost remarkable.”368 
365 Mary G. Ramos, “Galveston’s Response to the Hurricane of 1900,” Texas Almanac, accessed May 
6, 2014, http://www.texasalmanac.com/topics/history/galvestons-response-hurricane-1900. 
366 Ibid. 
367 Mark Thoma, “The Galveston Hurricane of 1900,” Economists View, accessed May 1, 2014, 
http://economistsview.typepad.com/economistsview/2005/09/the_galveston_h.html. 
368 William C. Chase, Galveston in Nineteen Hundred: The Authorized and Official Record of the 
Proud City of the Southwest as it was Before and After the Hurricane of September 8, and a Logical 
Forecast of Its Future (Atlanta, GA: Southern Publishing and Book Co., 1900), 225. 
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Figure 22.  Panoramic Photo of Galveston after the Hurricane369  
Galveston underwent dramatic changes to recover from the storm. Responding to 
dissatisfaction with the management of the city, a recovery committee saw to establishing 
a new form of municipal government intended to be centralized and efficient to drive 
physical and economic recovery.370  
369 Ibid., 224. 
370 Bradley R. Rice, “The Galveston Plan of City Government by Commission: The Birth of a 
Progressive Idea,” Southwestern Historical Quarterly (Texas State Historical Association) 78, no. 4 (April 
1975): 365–408. 
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Figure 23.  Galveston, Texas, Storm Damage from 1900 Hurricane371 
The city constructed a three-mile long concrete seawall to stop incoming waves 
and deflect damage from future storms. Ambitiously, Galveston elevated the city greater 
than 16 feet as mitigation against storm surge flooding.372 Recovery occurred quickly, 
with McComb noting, “In the third week, Houston relief groups went home, the saloons 
reopened, the electric trolleys began operating and freight began moving through the 
harbor.”373 
Despite the speed of recovery and the dedication of Galvestonians to return the 
city to its former glory, the city was vulnerable to the changing economy of early 20th 
371 Chase, Galveston in Nineteen Hundred: The Authorized and Official Record of the Proud City of 
the Southwest as it was Before and After the Hurricane of September 8, and a Logical Forecast of Its 
Future, 12. 
372 Ramos, “Galveston’s Response to the Hurricane of 1900.”  
373 David G. McComb, Galveston: A History (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1986), 131–132. 
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century Texas. The City of Houston, approximately 50 miles northwest of Galveston, 
became the center of the Texas petrochemical industry.374 The economic fortunes and 
importance of Galveston moved northwest to Houston. Dredging of the Houston Ship 
Channel in 1914 continued eroding the economic significance of Galveston.375 Galveston 
recovered but has never been the important city it once was. Today, it serves primarily as 
a beach town and vacation area for Houstonians.376 Galveston residents and the United 
States had no intention of abandoning the city despite the devastation to the city. The 
diminishment of Galveston was unintentional as the economic conditions the city was 
built upon changed. With the oil industry and the City of Houston’s emergence, it is 
entirely possible that Galveston would have faced decline even without the damage of the 
1900 hurricane. 
Further research on the social, psychological, geopolitical, and economic 
challenges of the diminishment of communities following disaster and what economic, 
sociological, psychological, historical, and political challenges led to their decline, would 
be useful to identify steps that could limit this phenomenon as part of recovery planning 
frameworks. 
374 Roger M. Olien, “Oil and Gas Industry,” Texas State Historical Association, accessed May 9, 
2014, https://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/online/articles/doogz. 
375 Thoma, “The Galveston Hurricane of 1900.”  
376 Amanda Ripley, “A Brief History of: The 1900 Galveston Hurricane,” Time, accessed May 6, 
2014, http://content.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1841442,00.html. 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS 
Through the study of the case studies post-disaster actions, insights were gathered 
in challenges facing reconstruction and recovery. Courses of action were determined that 
promote decisions benefitting disaster recovery and to avoid those decisions that hindered 
reconstruction in the studied communities. 
Findings of the research were that abandonment was rejected by community 
actions in the case study communities. Even in Valdez, which had to be moved from a 
precarious site. Survivors of disaster in those communities, despite their tragic losses, 
wanted to rebuild, and fought with the government in some cases to stay in their 
communities. For those survivors leaving the community, or denied the opportunity to 
participate in its reconstruction, psychological and social issues developed, which 
impacted the recovery.  
The strongest and intertwined trend in the case study communities was the 
importance of land use planning in planning for, responding to, and recovering from 
disaster. Based on the case studies and learning from the challenges they faced post-
disaster, the conclusion of this research is that land use planning, and producing zoning 
and comprehensive planning of economic, residential, and industrial locations in a 
community, is critical to disaster response, resilience, and recovery. For areas subject to 
natural disaster, or other homeland security concerns, such as terrorism, land use 
planning should, pre-event, be more intimately interwoven, planning both for 
development and reconstruction following disaster with emergency management 
organizations dealing with response and recovery planning. Involvement of the public in 
the design and implementation of recovery plans was also shown to be a primary catalyst 
for the successful emergence of communities from disaster. 
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